linux-kernel - Re: Crash when attaching uretprobes to processes running in Docker

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Message-ID: <20250115184011.GA21801@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2025 19:40:11 +0100
From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
To: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <olsajiri@...il.com>, Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@...il.com>,
	Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>,
	Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	linux-trace-kernel <linux-trace-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	BPF-dev-list <bpf@...r.kernel.org>,
	Song Liu <songliubraving@...com>, Yonghong Song <yhs@...com>,
	John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
	Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
	Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@...nel.org>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
	Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@...il.com>,
	"rostedt@...dmis.org" <rostedt@...dmis.org>, rafi@....io,
	Shmulik Ladkani <shmulik.ladkani@...il.com>
Subject: Re: Crash when attaching uretprobes to processes running in Docker

On 01/15, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
>
> On Wed, Jan 15, 2025 at 7:06 AM Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com> wrote:
> >
> > Or we can change __secure_computing() to do nothing if
> > this_syscall == __NR_uretprobe.
>
> I think that's the best way forward.
> seccomp already allowlists sigreturn syscall.

Only if SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT. But it won't help if we add __NR_uretprobe
into into mode1_syscalls/mode1_syscalls_32.

SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER can do anything. Just I guess nobody tries to offend
sigreturn for obvious reasons.

But yes, perhaps we do not have a better solution.

Oleg.