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Message-ID: <20250123214911.GB969@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net>
Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2025 22:49:11 +0100
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org, tglx@...utronix.de,
bp@...en8.de, joro@...tes.org, luto@...nel.org,
kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com, rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com,
jgross@...e.com
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/8] x86/mm: Simplify PAE page table handling
On Thu, Jan 23, 2025 at 09:24:28AM -0800, Dave Hansen wrote:
> tl;dr: 32-bit PAE page table handing is a bit different when PTI
> is on and off. Making the handling uniform removes a good amount
> of code at the cost of not sharing kernel PMDs. The downside of
> this simplification is bloating non-PTI PAE kernels by ~2 pages
> per process.
>
> Anyone who cares about security on 32-bit is running with PTI and
> PAE because PAE has the No-eXecute page table bit. They are already
> paying the 2-page penalty. Anyone who cares more about memory
> footprint than security is probably already running a !PAE kernel
> and will not be affected by this.
The reality is that many of the mitigations we have are 64bit only.
32bit is known insecure. There is absolutely no point in using PTI on
32bit at all.
Can't we just rip it out?
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