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Message-ID: <20250211001044.o3loayfnpcodvgy6@jpoimboe>
Date: Mon, 10 Feb 2025 16:10:44 -0800
From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>
To: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@....com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, x86@...nel.org,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 12/35] x86/bugs: Restructure retbleed mitigation
On Wed, Jan 08, 2025 at 02:24:52PM -0600, David Kaplan wrote:
> @@ -1254,27 +1269,6 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
> (retbleed_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt()))
> cpu_smt_disable(false);
>
> - /*
> - * Let IBRS trump all on Intel without affecting the effects of the
> - * retbleed= cmdline option except for call depth based stuffing
> - */
> - if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) {
> - switch (spectre_v2_enabled) {
> - case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS:
> - retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS;
> - break;
> - case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
> - case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
> - case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
> - retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS;
> - break;
> - default:
> - if (retbleed_mitigation != RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF)
> - pr_err(RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG);
> - }
> - }
> -
> - pr_info("%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]);
> }
Extra whitespace at end of function.
--
Josh
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