linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] KVM: s390: pv: fix race when making a page secure

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Message-ID: <6c741da9-a793-4a59-920f-8df77807bc4d@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Feb 2025 21:16:03 +0100
From: David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
To: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@...ux.ibm.com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-s390@...r.kernel.org,
 frankja@...ux.ibm.com, borntraeger@...ibm.com, nrb@...ux.ibm.com,
 seiden@...ux.ibm.com, nsg@...ux.ibm.com, schlameuss@...ux.ibm.com,
 hca@...ux.ibm.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] KVM: s390: pv: fix race when making a page secure

On 13.02.25 21:07, Claudio Imbrenda wrote:
> Holding the pte lock for the page that is being converted to secure is
> needed to avoid races. A previous commit removed the locking, which
> caused issues. Fix by locking the pte again.
> 
> Fixes: 5cbe24350b7d ("KVM: s390: move pv gmap functions into kvm")

If you found this because of my report about the changed locking, 
consider adding a Suggested-by / Reported-y.

> Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@...ux.ibm.com>
> ---
>   arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h |  2 +-
>   arch/s390/kernel/uv.c      | 19 +++++++++++++++++--
>   arch/s390/kvm/gmap.c       | 12 ++++++++----
>   3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h
> index b11f5b6d0bd1..46fb0ef6f984 100644
> --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h
> +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h
> @@ -631,7 +631,7 @@ int uv_pin_shared(unsigned long paddr);
>   int uv_destroy_folio(struct folio *folio);
>   int uv_destroy_pte(pte_t pte);
>   int uv_convert_from_secure_pte(pte_t pte);
> -int make_folio_secure(struct folio *folio, struct uv_cb_header *uvcb);
> +int make_hva_secure(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long hva, struct uv_cb_header *uvcb);
>   int uv_convert_from_secure(unsigned long paddr);
>   int uv_convert_from_secure_folio(struct folio *folio);
>   
> diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
> index 9f05df2da2f7..de3c092da7b9 100644
> --- a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
> +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
> @@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ static int expected_folio_refs(struct folio *folio)
>    * Context: The caller must hold exactly one extra reference on the folio
>    *          (it's the same logic as split_folio())
>    */
> -int make_folio_secure(struct folio *folio, struct uv_cb_header *uvcb)
> +static int __make_folio_secure(struct folio *folio, unsigned long hva, struct uv_cb_header *uvcb)
>   {
>   	int expected, cc = 0;
>   
> @@ -277,7 +277,22 @@ int make_folio_secure(struct folio *folio, struct uv_cb_header *uvcb)
>   		return -EAGAIN;
>   	return uvcb->rc == 0x10a ? -ENXIO : -EINVAL;
>   }
> -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(make_folio_secure);
> +
> +int make_hva_secure(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long hva, struct uv_cb_header *uvcb)
> +{
> +	spinlock_t *ptelock;
> +	pte_t *ptep;
> +	int rc;
> +
> +	ptep = get_locked_pte(mm, hva, &ptelock);
> +	if (!ptep)
> +		return -ENXIO;
> +	rc = __make_folio_secure(page_folio(pte_page(*ptep)), hva, uvcb);
> +	pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptelock);
> +
> +	return rc;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(make_hva_secure);
>   
>   /*
>    * To be called with the folio locked or with an extra reference! This will
> diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/gmap.c b/arch/s390/kvm/gmap.c
> index fc4d490d25a2..e56c0ab5fec7 100644
> --- a/arch/s390/kvm/gmap.c
> +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/gmap.c
> @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ static bool should_export_before_import(struct uv_cb_header *uvcb, struct mm_str
>   	return atomic_read(&mm->context.protected_count) > 1;
>   }
>   
> -static int __gmap_make_secure(struct gmap *gmap, struct page *page, void *uvcb)
> +static int __gmap_make_secure(struct gmap *gmap, struct page *page, unsigned long hva, void *uvcb)
>   {
>   	struct folio *folio = page_folio(page);
>   	int rc;
> @@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ static int __gmap_make_secure(struct gmap *gmap, struct page *page, void *uvcb)
>   		return -EAGAIN;
>   	if (should_export_before_import(uvcb, gmap->mm))
>   		uv_convert_from_secure(folio_to_phys(folio));
> -	rc = make_folio_secure(folio, uvcb);
> +	rc = make_hva_secure(gmap->mm, hva, uvcb);
>   	folio_unlock(folio);
>   
>   	/*
> @@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ static int __gmap_make_secure(struct gmap *gmap, struct page *page, void *uvcb)
>   int gmap_make_secure(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr, void *uvcb)
>   {
>   	struct kvm *kvm = gmap->private;
> +	unsigned long vmaddr;
>   	struct page *page;
>   	int rc = 0;
>   
> @@ -127,8 +128,11 @@ int gmap_make_secure(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr, void *uvcb)
>   
>   	page = gfn_to_page(kvm, gpa_to_gfn(gaddr));
>   	mmap_read_lock(gmap->mm);
> -	if (page)
> -		rc = __gmap_make_secure(gmap, page, uvcb);
> +	vmaddr = gfn_to_hva(gmap->private, gpa_to_gfn(gaddr));
> +	if (kvm_is_error_hva(vmaddr))
> +		rc = -ENXIO;
> +	if (!rc && page)
> +		rc = __gmap_make_secure(gmap, page, vmaddr, uvcb);
>   	kvm_release_page_clean(page);
>   	mmap_read_unlock(gmap->mm);
>   

You effectively make the code more complicated and inefficient than 
before. Now you effectively walk the page table twice in the common 
small-folio case ...

Can we just go back to the old handling that we had before here?

-- 
Cheers,

David / dhildenb