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Message-Id: <20250224141120.1240534-2-arnd@kernel.org>
Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2025 15:07:36 +0100
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...nel.org>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Nathan Chancellor <nathan@...nel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Nick Desaulniers <nick.desaulniers+lkml@...il.com>,
Bill Wendling <morbo@...gle.com>,
Justin Stitt <justinstitt@...gle.com>,
Frank van der Linden <fvdl@...gle.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>,
Zi Yan <ziy@...dia.com>,
linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
llvm@...ts.linux.dev
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] mm, cma: use literal printf format string
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>
Using a variable string as a printf format can be a security issue
that clang warns about when extra warnings are enabled:
mm/cma.c:239:37: error: format string is not a string literal (potentially insecure) [-Werror,-Wformat-security]
239 | snprintf(cma->name, CMA_MAX_NAME, name);
| ^~~~
This one does not appear to be a security issue since the string is
not user controlled, but it's better to avoid the warning.
Use "%s" as the format instead and just pass the name as the argument.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>
---
mm/cma.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/mm/cma.c b/mm/cma.c
index ef0206c0f16d..09322b8284bd 100644
--- a/mm/cma.c
+++ b/mm/cma.c
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ static int __init cma_new_area(const char *name, phys_addr_t size,
cma_area_count++;
if (name)
- snprintf(cma->name, CMA_MAX_NAME, name);
+ snprintf(cma->name, CMA_MAX_NAME, "%s", name);
else
snprintf(cma->name, CMA_MAX_NAME, "cma%d\n", cma_area_count);
--
2.39.5
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