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Message-ID: <a32e4a47-13bb-40ce-a4b9-f20c6d38cb2d@intel.com>
Date: Thu, 27 Feb 2025 16:14:51 +0200
From: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@...el.com>
To: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@...el.com>, <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
<seanjc@...gle.com>
CC: <kvm@...r.kernel.org>, <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
<kai.huang@...el.com>, <reinette.chatre@...el.com>,
<tony.lindgren@...ux.intel.com>, <binbin.wu@...ux.intel.com>,
<dmatlack@...gle.com>, <isaku.yamahata@...el.com>, <nik.borisov@...e.com>,
<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, <yan.y.zhao@...el.com>, <chao.gao@...el.com>,
<weijiang.yang@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V2 02/12] KVM: x86: Allow the use of
kvm_load_host_xsave_state() with guest_state_protected
On 25/02/25 07:56, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
> On 2/24/2025 7:38 PM, Adrian Hunter wrote:
>> On 20/02/25 12:50, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
>>> On 1/29/2025 5:58 PM, Adrian Hunter wrote:
>>>> From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
>>>>
>>>> Allow the use of kvm_load_host_xsave_state() with
>>>> vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected == true. This will allow TDX to reuse
>>>> kvm_load_host_xsave_state() instead of creating its own version.
>>>>
>>>> For consistency, amend kvm_load_guest_xsave_state() also.
>>>>
>>>> Ensure that guest state that kvm_load_host_xsave_state() depends upon,
>>>> such as MSR_IA32_XSS, cannot be changed by user space, if
>>>> guest_state_protected.
>>>>
>>>> [Adrian: wrote commit message]
>>>>
>>>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Z2GiQS_RmYeHU09L@google.com
>>>> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@...el.com>
>>>> ---
>>>> TD vcpu enter/exit v2:
>>>> - New patch
>>>> ---
>>>> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 7 +++++--
>>>> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 18 +++++++++++-------
>>>> 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
>>>> index 7640a84e554a..b4bcfe15ad5e 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
>>>> @@ -4253,7 +4253,9 @@ static __no_kcsan fastpath_t svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>>>> svm_set_dr6(svm, DR6_ACTIVE_LOW);
>>>> clgi();
>>>> - kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(vcpu);
>>>> +
>>>> + if (!vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
>>>> + kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(vcpu);
>>>> kvm_wait_lapic_expire(vcpu);
>>>> @@ -4282,7 +4284,8 @@ static __no_kcsan fastpath_t svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>>>> if (unlikely(svm->vmcb->control.exit_code == SVM_EXIT_NMI))
>>>> kvm_before_interrupt(vcpu, KVM_HANDLING_NMI);
>>>> - kvm_load_host_xsave_state(vcpu);
>>>> + if (!vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
>>>> + kvm_load_host_xsave_state(vcpu);
>>>> stgi();
>>>> /* Any pending NMI will happen here */
>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>>>> index bbb6b7f40b3a..5cf9f023fd4b 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>>>> @@ -1169,11 +1169,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_lmsw);
>>>> void kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>>>> {
>>>> - if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
>>>> - return;
>>>> + WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected);
>>>> if (kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_OSXSAVE)) {
>>>> -
>>>> if (vcpu->arch.xcr0 != kvm_host.xcr0)
>>>> xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK, vcpu->arch.xcr0);
>>>> @@ -1192,13 +1190,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_load_guest_xsave_state);
>>>> void kvm_load_host_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>>>> {
>>>> - if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
>>>> - return;
>>>> -
>>>> if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_PKU) &&
>>>> ((vcpu->arch.xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU) ||
>>>> kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_PKE))) {
>>>> - vcpu->arch.pkru = rdpkru();
>>>> + if (!vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
>>>> + vcpu->arch.pkru = rdpkru();
>>>
>>> this needs justification.
>>
>> It was proposed by Sean here:
>>
>> https://lore.kernel.org/all/Z2WZ091z8GmGjSbC@google.com/
>>
>> which is part of the email thread referenced by the "Link:" tag above
>
> IMHO, this change needs to be put in patch 07, which is the better place to justify it.
>
>>>
>>>> if (vcpu->arch.pkru != vcpu->arch.host_pkru)
>>>> wrpkru(vcpu->arch.host_pkru);
>>>> }
>>>
>>>
>>>> @@ -3916,6 +3912,10 @@ int kvm_set_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
>>>> if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
>>>> !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
>>>> return 1;
>>>> +
>>>> + if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
>>>> + return 1;
>>>> +
>>>
>>> this and below change need to be a separate patch. So that we can discuss independently.
>>>
>>> I see no reason to make MSR_IA32_XSS special than other MSRs. When guest_state_protected, most of the MSRs that aren't emulated by KVM are inaccessible by KVM.
>>
>> Yes, TDX will block access to MSR_IA32_XSS anyway because
>> tdx_has_emulated_msr() will return false for MSR_IA32_XSS.
>>
>> However kvm_load_host_xsave_state() is not TDX-specific code and it
>> relies upon vcpu->arch.ia32_xss, so there is reason to block
>> access to it when vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected is true.
>
> It is TDX specific logic that TDX requires vcpu->arch.ia32_xss unchanged since TDX is going to utilize kvm_load_host_xsave_state() to restore host xsave state and relies on vcpu->arch.ia32_xss to be always the value of XFAM & XSS_MASK.
>
> So please put this change into the TDX specific patch with the clear justfication.
This patch set is owned by Paolo now, so it is up to him.
>>>
>>>> /*
>>>> * KVM supports exposing PT to the guest, but does not support
>>>> * IA32_XSS[bit 8]. Guests have to use RDMSR/WRMSR rather than
>>>> @@ -4375,6 +4375,10 @@ int kvm_get_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
>>>> if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
>>>> !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
>>>> return 1;
>>>> +
>>>> + if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
>>>> + return 1;
>>>> +
>>>> msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.ia32_xss;
>>>> break;
>>>> case MSR_K7_CLK_CTL:
>>>
>>
>
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