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Message-ID: <506e8e58e5236a4525b18d84bafa9aae80b24452.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 27 Feb 2025 15:41:18 -0500
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
To: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>,
Paul Moore
<paul@...l-moore.com>, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Jarkko
Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
Cc: "open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM" <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>,
"herbert@...dor.apana.org.au"
<herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
"davem@...emloft.net"
<davem@...emloft.net>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>, James Morris
<jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Roberto Sassu
<roberto.sassu@...wei.com>,
Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>,
Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
"casey@...aufler-ca.com" <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Stefan Berger
<stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>,
"ebiggers@...nel.org" <ebiggers@...nel.org>,
Randy
Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"keyrings@...r.kernel.org" <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org" <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-efi@...r.kernel.org" <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org" <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 00/13] Clavis LSM
On Mon, 2025-01-06 at 17:15 +0000, Eric Snowberg wrote:
>
> > On Jan 5, 2025, at 8:40 PM, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Fri, Jan 3, 2025 at 11:48 PM Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > Regardless, back to Clavis ... reading quickly through the cover
> > > letter again, I do somewhat wonder if this isn't better integrated
> > > into the keyring proper; have you talked to both David and Jarkko
> > > about this?
> >
> > I realize I should probably expand on my thinking a bit, especially
> > since my comment a while regarding LSMs dedicated to enforcing access
> > control on keys is what was given as a reason for making Clavis a LSM.
> >
> > I still stand by my comment from over a year ago that I see no reason
> > why we couldn't support a LSM that enforces access controls on
> > keyrings/keys. What gives me pause with the Clavis LSM is that so
> > much of Clavis is resident in the keyrings themselves, e.g. Clavis
> > policy ACLs and authorization keys, that it really feels like it
> > should be part of the keys subsystem and not a LSM. Yes, existing
> > LSMs do have LSM specific data that resides outside of the LSM and in
> > an object's subsystem, but that is usually limited to security
> > identifiers and similar things, not the LSM's security policy.
Hi Jarkko, David,
Both Paul's and my main concerns with this patch set is storing policy in the
keyring. We would appreciate your chiming in here about storing key policy in
the keyring itself.
thanks,
Mimi
> >
> > That's my current thinking, and why I asked about locating Clavis in
> > the keys subsystem directly (although I still think better keyring
> > granularity and a shift towards usage based keyrings is the better
> > option). If David and Jarkko are opposed to integrating Clavis into
> > the keys subsystem we can consider this as a LSM, I'm just not sure
> > it's the best first option. Does that make sense?
>
> Thanks for your feedback Paul. I have no preference if it is a new LSM
> or not. My interest is finding the path of least resistance to get this type
> of capability added to mainline code. Hopefully David and Jarkko will
> provide their opinions.
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