linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 00/13] Clavis LSM

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <Z8ea2TRPS6uMgXxG@kernel.org>
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 2025 02:29:13 +0200
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
To: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
	"open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM" <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>,
	"herbert@...dor.apana.org.au" <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
	"davem@...emloft.net" <davem@...emloft.net>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
	Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>,
	Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>,
	Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
	"casey@...aufler-ca.com" <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
	Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>,
	"ebiggers@...nel.org" <ebiggers@...nel.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
	open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	"keyrings@...r.kernel.org" <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>,
	"linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org" <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
	"linux-efi@...r.kernel.org" <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
	"linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org" <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 00/13] Clavis LSM

On Tue, Mar 04, 2025 at 07:25:13PM -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 4, 2025 at 5:25 PM Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org> wrote:
> > On Mon, Mar 03, 2025 at 05:40:54PM -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> > > On Fri, Feb 28, 2025 at 12:52 PM Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com> wrote:
> > > > > On Feb 28, 2025, at 9:14 AM, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com> wrote:
> > > > > On Fri, Feb 28, 2025 at 9:09 AM Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com> wrote:
> > > > >> On Thu, 2025-02-27 at 17:22 -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> > > > >>>
> > > > >>> I'd still also like to see some discussion about moving towards the
> > > > >>> addition of keyrings oriented towards usage instead of limiting
> > > > >>> ourselves to keyrings that are oriented on the source of the keys.
> > > > >>> Perhaps I'm missing some important detail which makes this
> > > > >>> impractical, but it seems like an obvious improvement to me and would
> > > > >>> go a long way towards solving some of the problems that we typically
> > > > >>> see with kernel keys.
> > > >
> > > > The intent is not to limit ourselves to the source of the key.  The main
> > > > point of Clavis is to allow the end-user to determine what kernel keys
> > > > they want to trust and for what purpose, irrespective of the originating
> > > > source (.builtin_trusted, .secondary, .machine, or .platform). If we could
> > > > go back in time, individual keyrings could be created that are oriented
> > > > toward usage.   The idea for introducing Clavis is to bridge what we
> > > > have today with kernel keys and allow them to be usage based.
> > >
> > > While it is unlikely that the current well known keyrings could be
> > > removed, I see no reason why new usage oriented keyrings could not be
> > > introduced.  We've seen far more significant shifts in the kernel over
> > > the years.
> >
> > Could we implement such change in a way that these new imaginary
> > (at this point) usage oriented keyrings would be used to create
> > the "legacy" keyrings?
> 
> I think it would be easier for them to coexist so that one could have
> an easier migration.  It's possible that even once everything was
> migrated to the new usage oriented keyrings it would still make sense
> to keep the existing keyrings in place and always link keys from there
> to the newer usage keyrings.

OK, so here I agree and disagree:

1. It probably does not port everything.
2. Still, we need to be sure that "can be done" condition is satisfied
   for the sake of robustness.


> 
> -- 
> paul-moore.com
> 

BR, Jarkko