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Message-ID: <Z9GezONZJ_sDuwFy@calendula>
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 2025 15:48:44 +0100
From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@...filter.org>
To: Julian Anastasov <ja@....bg>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...aro.org>,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@...eddedor.com>,
Simon Horman <horms@...ge.net.au>,
Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@...filter.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, lvs-devel@...r.kernel.org,
netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org, coreteam@...filter.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kernel-janitors@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 net] ipvs: prevent integer overflow in
do_ip_vs_get_ctl()
On Tue, Mar 11, 2025 at 07:50:44PM +0200, Julian Anastasov wrote:
>
> Hello,
>
> On Mon, 10 Mar 2025, Dan Carpenter wrote:
>
> > The get->num_services variable is an unsigned int which is controlled by
> > the user. The struct_size() function ensures that the size calculation
> > does not overflow an unsigned long, however, we are saving the result to
> > an int so the calculation can overflow.
> >
> > Both "len" and "get->num_services" come from the user. This check is
> > just a sanity check to help the user and ensure they are using the API
> > correctly. An integer overflow here is not a big deal. This has no
> > security impact.
> >
> > Save the result from struct_size() type size_t to fix this integer
> > overflow bug.
> >
> > Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
> > Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...aro.org>
>
> Looks good to me, thanks!
>
> Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@....bg>
>
> Pablo, you can apply it to the nf tree.
Done, thanks Julian.
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