linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v4 17/36] Documentation/x86: Document the new attack vector controls

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Message-ID: <mybnv24fbz5nsxmz2yihzctnbv7ab7sznyotupp6mbpzfdvy2e@r2oantiw4wmo>
Date: Mon, 14 Apr 2025 16:51:11 -0700
From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>
To: "Kaplan, David" <David.Kaplan@....com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, 
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>, 
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, 
	"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, 
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@...gle.com>, 
	Derek Manwaring <derekmn@...zon.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 17/36] Documentation/x86: Document the new attack
 vector controls

On Mon, Apr 14, 2025 at 09:15:54PM +0000, Kaplan, David wrote:
> [AMD Official Use Only - AMD Internal Distribution Only]
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>
> > Sent: Thursday, April 10, 2025 1:15 PM
> > To: Kaplan, David <David.Kaplan@....com>
> > Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>; Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>;
> > Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>; Pawan Gupta
> > <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>; Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>; Dave
> > Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>; x86@...nel.org; H . Peter Anvin
> > <hpa@...or.com>; linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org; Brendan Jackman
> > <jackmanb@...gle.com>; Derek Manwaring <derekmn@...zon.com>
> > Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 17/36] Documentation/x86: Document the new attack
> > vector controls
> >
> > Caution: This message originated from an External Source. Use proper caution
> > when opening attachments, clicking links, or responding.
> >
> >
> > On Mon, Mar 10, 2025 at 11:40:04AM -0500, David Kaplan wrote:
> > > +=============== ============== ============ =============
> > ============== ============
> > > +Vulnerability   User-to-Kernel User-to-User Guest-to-Host Guest-to-Guest
> > Cross-Thread
> > > +=============== ============== ============ =============
> > ============== ============
> > > +BHI                   X                           X
> > > +GDS                   X              X            X              X        (Note 1)
> > > +L1TF                  X                           X                       (Note 2)
> > > +MDS                   X              X            X              X        (Note 2)
> > > +MMIO                  X              X            X              X        (Note 2)
> > > +Meltdown              X
> > > +Retbleed              X                           X                       (Note 3)
> > > +RFDS                  X              X            X              X
> > > +Spectre_v1            X
> > > +Spectre_v2            X                           X
> > > +Spectre_v2_user                      X                           X        (Note 1)
> > > +SRBDS                 X              X            X              X
> > > +SRSO                  X                           X
> > > +SSB (Note 4)
> >
> > Any reason not to put the "Note 4" in the same column as the others?
> >
> 
> The other notes are about cross-thread mitigation specifically and those notes refer to the SMT aspects of those issues.
> 
> Note 4 in this case is about the SSB vulnerability itself, explaining
> that by default there is no mitigation for any case.  I was concerned
> that including SSB but without any X's in any of the columns would be
> confusing, so the note attempted to explain that there were no default
> mitigations for SSB under any attack vector.

Putting the note there makes it a lot harder to see it.  And I think the
lack of X's is accurate, no?

-- 
Josh