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Message-ID: <CAADnVQ+LMAnyT4yV5iuJ=vswgtUu97cHKnvysipc6o7HZfEbUA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Apr 2025 14:48:25 -0700
From: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>
To: Blaise Boscaccy <bboscaccy@...ux.microsoft.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>, "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@...nel.org>,
Nathan Chancellor <nathan@...nel.org>, Nicolas Schier <nicolas@...sle.eu>, Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,
Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
Günther Noack <gnoack@...gle.com>,
Nick Desaulniers <nick.desaulniers+lkml@...il.com>, Bill Wendling <morbo@...gle.com>,
Justin Stitt <justinstitt@...gle.com>, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
Jan Stancek <jstancek@...hat.com>, Neal Gompa <neal@...pa.dev>,
"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
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Matteo Croce <teknoraver@...a.com>, Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>,
Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 security-next 1/4] security: Hornet LSM
On Tue, Apr 15, 2025 at 8:45 AM Blaise Boscaccy
<bboscaccy@...ux.microsoft.com> wrote:
>
> The eBPF dev community has spent what, 4-5 years on this, with little to
> no progress. I have little faith that this is going to progress on your
> end in a timely manner or at all, and frankly we (and others) needed
> this yesterday.
History repeats itself.
1. the problem is hard.
2. you're only interested in addressing your own use case.
There is no end-to-end design here and no attempt to
think it through how it will work for others.
> Hornet has zero impact on the bpf subsystem, yet you
> seem viscerally opposed to us doing this.
Hacking into bpf internal objects like maps is not acceptable.
> Why are you trying to stop us
> from securing our cloud?
Keep your lsm hack out-of-tree, please.
> Since this will require an LSM no matter what, there is zero reason for
> us not to proceed with Hornet. If or when you actually figure out how to
> sign an lskel and upstream updated LSM hooks, I can always rework Hornet
> to use that instead.
You can do whatever you want out-of-tree including re-exporting kern_sys_bpf.
> code signing last week. All we are trying to do is make our cloud
> ever-so-slightly more secure and share the results with the community.
You're pushing for a custom microsoft specific hack while
ignoring community feedback.
> The attack vectors I'm looking at are things like CVE-2021-33200.
4 year old bug ? If your kernels are so old you have lots of
other vulnerabilities.
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