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Message-ID: <87y0w0hv2x.fsf@microsoft.com>
Date: Wed, 16 Apr 2025 10:31:18 -0700
From: Blaise Boscaccy <bboscaccy@...ux.microsoft.com>
To: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 security-next 1/4] security: Hornet LSM
Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com> writes:
> History repeats itself.
> 1. the problem is hard.
> 2. you're only interested in addressing your own use case.
> There is no end-to-end design here and no attempt to
> think it through how it will work for others.
>
Well, I suppose anything worth doing is going to be hard :)
The end-to-end design for this is the same end-to-end design that exists
for signing kernel modules today. We envisioned it working for others
the same way module signing works for others.
> Hacking into bpf internal objects like maps is not acceptable.
We've heard your concerns about kern_sys_bpf and we agree that the LSM
should not be calling it. The proposal in this email should meet both of
our needs
https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/874iypjl8t.fsf@microsoft.com/
-blaise
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