[<prev] [next>] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <20250529180352.1935517-1-dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Date: Thu, 29 May 2025 11:03:52 -0700
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
To: torvalds@...ux-foundation.org
Cc: x86@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: [GIT PULL] x86/sgx for 6.16-rc1
Hi Linus,
Continuing the trend of a slow dribble of SGX updates, please pull a
couple x86/sgx changes for 6.16-rc1.
The first one is a no-brainer to use the (simple) SHA-256 library.
For the second one, some folks doing testing noticed that SGX systems
under memory pressure were inducing fatal machine checks at pretty
unnerving rates, despite the SGX code having _some_ awareness of
memory poison. Turns out that the SGX reclaim path was not checking
for poison _and_ it always accesses memory to copy it around. Make
sure that poisoned pages are not reclaimed.
--
The following changes since commit b4432656b36e5cc1d50a1f2dc15357543add530e:
Linux 6.15-rc4 (2025-04-27 15:19:23 -0700)
are available in the Git repository at:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git tags/x86_sgx_for_6.16-rc1
for you to fetch changes up to ed16618c380c32c68c06186d0ccbb0d5e0586e59:
x86/sgx: Prevent attempts to reclaim poisoned pages (2025-05-15 19:01:45 +0200)
----------------------------------------------------------------
* Make SGX less likely to induce fatal machine checks
* Use much more compact SHA-256 library API
----------------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Zaborowski (1):
x86/sgx: Prevent attempts to reclaim poisoned pages
Eric Biggers (1):
x86/sgx: Use SHA-256 library API instead of crypto_shash API
arch/x86/Kconfig | 3 +--
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h | 1 -
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 30 ++----------------------------
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 2 ++
4 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
Powered by blists - more mailing lists