linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] erofs: impersonate the opener's credentials when accessing backing file

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <68eb3c3b-b67c-46e7-a6a5-044d4415e2b7@huawei.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2025 09:46:53 +0800
From: Hongbo Li <lihongbo22@...wei.com>
To: Tatsuyuki Ishi <ishitatsuyuki@...gle.com>, Gao Xiang <xiang@...nel.org>,
	Chao Yu <chao@...nel.org>, Yue Hu <zbestahu@...il.com>, Jeffle Xu
	<jefflexu@...ux.alibaba.com>, Sandeep Dhavale <dhavale@...gle.com>
CC: <linux-erofs@...ts.ozlabs.org>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	<shengyong1@...omi.com>, <wangshuai12@...omi.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] erofs: impersonate the opener's credentials when
 accessing backing file



On 2025/6/12 18:18, Tatsuyuki Ishi wrote:
> Previously, file operations on a file-backed mount used the current
> process' credentials to access the backing FD. Attempting to do so on
> Android lead to SELinux denials, as ACL rules on the backing file (e.g.
> /system/apex/foo.apex) is restricted to a small set of process.
> Arguably, this error is redundant and leaking implementation details, as
> access to files on a mount is already ACL'ed by path.
> 
> Instead, override to use the opener's cred when accessing the backing
> file. This makes the behavior similar to a loop-backed mount, which
> uses kworker cred when accessing the backing file and does not cause
> SELinux denials.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Tatsuyuki Ishi <ishitatsuyuki@...gle.com>
> ---
>   fs/erofs/fileio.c | 3 +++
>   1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/erofs/fileio.c b/fs/erofs/fileio.c
> index 7d81f504bff08f3d5c5d44d131460df5c3e7847d..df5cc63f2c01eb5e7ec4afab9e054ea12cea7175 100644
> --- a/fs/erofs/fileio.c
> +++ b/fs/erofs/fileio.c
> @@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ static void erofs_fileio_ki_complete(struct kiocb *iocb, long ret)
>   
>   static void erofs_fileio_rq_submit(struct erofs_fileio_rq *rq)
>   {
> +	const struct cred *old_cred;
>   	struct iov_iter iter;
>   	int ret;
>   
> @@ -60,7 +61,9 @@ static void erofs_fileio_rq_submit(struct erofs_fileio_rq *rq)
>   		rq->iocb.ki_flags = IOCB_DIRECT;
>   	iov_iter_bvec(&iter, ITER_DEST, rq->bvecs, rq->bio.bi_vcnt,
>   		      rq->bio.bi_iter.bi_size);
> +	old_cred = override_creds(rq->iocb.ki_filp->f_cred);Yeah, rq->iocb.ki_filp keep the opener's cred, so:

Reviewed-by: Hongbo Li <lihongbo22@...wei.com>

Thanks,
Hongbo

>   	ret = vfs_iocb_iter_read(rq->iocb.ki_filp, &rq->iocb, &iter);
> +	revert_creds(old_cred);
>   	if (ret != -EIOCBQUEUED)
>   		erofs_fileio_ki_complete(&rq->iocb, ret);
>   }
> 
> ---
> base-commit: cd2e103d57e5615f9bb027d772f93b9efd567224
> change-id: 20250612-b4-erofs-impersonate-d6c2926c56ca
> 
> Best regards,