linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] fs: export anon_inode_make_secure

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Message-ID: <49404594-880d-4f48-a855-1066b295009d@amd.com>
Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2025 11:02:26 +0530
From: Shivank Garg <shivankg@....com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>, Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>, Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
 david@...hat.com, akpm@...ux-foundation.org, paul@...l-moore.com,
 viro@...iv.linux.org.uk, willy@...radead.org, pbonzini@...hat.com,
 tabba@...gle.com, afranji@...gle.com, ackerleytng@...gle.com, jack@...e.cz,
 hch@...radead.org, cgzones@...glemail.com, ira.weiny@...el.com,
 roypat@...zon.co.uk, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
 linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] fs: export anon_inode_make_secure_inode() and fix
 secretmem LSM bypass



On 6/20/2025 8:32 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 19, 2025, Mike Rapoport wrote:
>> On Thu, Jun 19, 2025 at 02:06:17PM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:
>>> On Thu, Jun 19, 2025 at 02:01:22PM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
>>>> On Thu, Jun 19, 2025 at 12:38:25PM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:
>>>>> On Thu, Jun 19, 2025 at 11:13:49AM +0200, Vlastimil Babka wrote:
>>>>>> On 6/19/25 09:31, Shivank Garg wrote:
>>>>>>> Export anon_inode_make_secure_inode() to allow KVM guest_memfd to create
>>>>>>> anonymous inodes with proper security context. This replaces the current
>>>>>>> pattern of calling alloc_anon_inode() followed by
>>>>>>> inode_init_security_anon() for creating security context manually.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This change also fixes a security regression in secretmem where the
>>>>>>> S_PRIVATE flag was not cleared after alloc_anon_inode(), causing
>>>>>>> LSM/SELinux checks to be bypassed for secretmem file descriptors.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> As guest_memfd currently resides in the KVM module, we need to export this
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Could we use the new EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL_FOR_MODULES() thingy to make this
>>>>>> explicit for KVM?
>>>>>
>>>>> Oh? Enlighten me about that, if you have a second, please. 
>>>>
>>>> From Documentation/core-api/symbol-namespaces.rst:
>>>>
>>>> The macro takes a comma separated list of module names, allowing only those
>>>> modules to access this symbol. Simple tail-globs are supported.
>>>>
>>>> For example::
>>>>
>>>>   EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL_FOR_MODULES(preempt_notifier_inc, "kvm,kvm-*")
>>>>
>>>> will limit usage of this symbol to modules whoes name matches the given
>>>> patterns.
>>>
>>> Is that still mostly advisory and can still be easily circumenvented?
> 
> Yes and no.  For out-of-tree modules, it's mostly advisory.  Though I can imagine
> if someone tries to report a bug because their module is masquerading as e.g. kvm,
> then they will be told to go away (in far less polite words :-D).
> 
> For in-tree modules, the restriction is much more enforceable.  Renaming a module
> to circumvent a restricted export will raise major red flags, and getting "proper"
> access to a symbol would require an ack from the relevant maintainers.  E.g. for
> many KVM-induced exports, it's not that other module writers are trying to misbehave,
> there simply aren't any guardrails to deter them from using a "dangerous" export.
>  
> The other big benefit I see is documentation, e.g. both for readers/developers to
> understand the intent, and for auditing purposes (I would be shocked if there
> aren't exports that were KVM-induced, but that are no longer necessary).
> 
> And we can utilize the framework to do additional hardening.  E.g. for exports
> that exist solely for KVM, I plan on adding wrappers so that the symbols are
> exproted if and only if KVM is enabled in the kernel .config[*].  Again, that's
> far from perfect, e.g. AFAIK every distro enables KVM, but it should help keep
> everyone honest.
> 
> [*] https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZzJOoFFPjrzYzKir@google.com 
> 
>> The commit message says
>>
>>    will limit the use of said function to kvm.ko, any other module trying
>>    to use this symbol will refure to load (and get modpost build
>>    failures).
> 
> To Christian's point, the restrictions are trivial to circumvent by out-of-tree
> modules.  E.g. to get access to the above, simply name your module kvm-lol.ko or
> whatever.

Thanks for the info.

I have posted the revised patch with EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL_FOR_MODULES:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20250620070328.803704-3-shivankg@amd.com

Please review when you have a chance.

Thanks,
Shivank