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Message-ID: <af700e33-5c73-40aa-96a3-91cd8bf64871@zytor.com>
Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2025 11:00:24 -0700
From: Xin Li <xin@...or.com>
To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, x86@...nel.org,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>,
"Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@...nel.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
Xiongwei Song <xiongwei.song@...driver.com>,
Xin Li <xin3.li@...el.com>, "Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@...nel.org>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>, Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>,
Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@....com>,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@...el.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>,
Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@...ux.intel.com>,
Kai Huang <kai.huang@...el.com>, Sandipan Das <sandipan.das@....com>,
Breno Leitao <leitao@...ian.org>,
Rick Edgecombe
<rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>, Hou Tao <houtao1@...wei.com>,
Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@...cle.com>, Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...pe.ca>,
"Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>, Yuntao Wang <ytcoode@...il.com>,
Rasmus Villemoes <linux@...musvillemoes.dk>,
Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@...roup.eu>,
Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>, Changbin Du <changbin.du@...wei.com>,
Huang Shijie <shijie@...amperecomputing.com>,
Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@...der.be>,
Namhyung Kim <namhyung@...nel.org>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...hat.com>, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org,
linux-mm@...ck.org
Subject: Re: [PATCHv7 01/16] x86/cpu: Enumerate the LASS feature bits
On 6/25/2025 5:50 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> From: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@...el.com>
>
> Linear Address Space Separation (LASS) is a security feature that
> intends to prevent malicious virtual address space accesses across
> user/kernel mode.
>
> Such mode based access protection already exists today with paging and
> features such as SMEP and SMAP. However, to enforce these protections,
> the processor must traverse the paging structures in memory. Malicious
> software can use timing information resulting from this traversal to
> determine details about the paging structures, and these details may
> also be used to determine the layout of the kernel memory.
>
> The LASS mechanism provides the same mode-based protections as paging
> but without traversing the paging structures. Because the protections
> enforced by LASS are applied before paging, software will not be able to
> derive paging-based timing information from the various caching
> structures such as the TLBs, mid-level caches, page walker, data caches,
> etc.
>
> LASS enforcement relies on the typical kernel implementation to divide
> the 64-bit virtual address space into two halves:
> Addr[63]=0 -> User address space
> Addr[63]=1 -> Kernel address space
>
> Any data access or code execution across address spaces typically
> results in a #GP fault.
>
> The LASS enforcement for kernel data access is dependent on CR4.SMAP
> being set. The enforcement can be disabled by toggling the RFLAGS.AC bit
> similar to SMAP.
>
> Define the CPU feature bits to enumerate this feature and include
> feature dependencies to reflect the same.
>
> LASS provides protection against a class of speculative attacks, such as
> SLAM[1]. Add the "lass" flag to /proc/cpuinfo to indicate that the feature
> is supported by hardware and enabled by the kernel. This allows userspace
> to determine if the setup is secure against such attacks.
>
> [1] https://download.vusec.net/papers/slam_sp24.pdf
>
> Co-developed-by: Yian Chen <yian.chen@...el.com>
> Signed-off-by: Yian Chen <yian.chen@...el.com>
> Signed-off-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@...el.com>
> Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/Kconfig.cpufeatures | 4 ++++
> arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h | 2 ++
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c | 1 +
> tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
> 5 files changed, 9 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig.cpufeatures b/arch/x86/Kconfig.cpufeatures
> index 250c10627ab3..733d5aff2456 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.cpufeatures
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.cpufeatures
> @@ -124,6 +124,10 @@ config X86_DISABLED_FEATURE_PCID
> def_bool y
> depends on !X86_64
>
> +config X86_DISABLED_FEATURE_LASS
> + def_bool y
> + depends on X86_32
> +
> config X86_DISABLED_FEATURE_PKU
> def_bool y
> depends on !X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> index b78af55aa22e..8eef1ad7aca2 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> @@ -313,6 +313,7 @@
> #define X86_FEATURE_SM4 (12*32+ 2) /* SM4 instructions */
> #define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI (12*32+ 4) /* "avx_vnni" AVX VNNI instructions */
> #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BF16 (12*32+ 5) /* "avx512_bf16" AVX512 BFLOAT16 instructions */
> +#define X86_FEATURE_LASS (12*32+ 6) /* "lass" Linear Address Space Separation */
> #define X86_FEATURE_CMPCCXADD (12*32+ 7) /* CMPccXADD instructions */
> #define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_PERFMON_EXT (12*32+ 8) /* Intel Architectural PerfMon Extension */
> #define X86_FEATURE_FZRM (12*32+10) /* Fast zero-length REP MOVSB */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h
> index f1a4adc78272..81d0c8bf1137 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h
> @@ -136,6 +136,8 @@
> #define X86_CR4_PKE _BITUL(X86_CR4_PKE_BIT)
> #define X86_CR4_CET_BIT 23 /* enable Control-flow Enforcement Technology */
> #define X86_CR4_CET _BITUL(X86_CR4_CET_BIT)
> +#define X86_CR4_LASS_BIT 27 /* enable Linear Address Space Separation support */
> +#define X86_CR4_LASS _BITUL(X86_CR4_LASS_BIT)
> #define X86_CR4_LAM_SUP_BIT 28 /* LAM for supervisor pointers */
> #define X86_CR4_LAM_SUP _BITUL(X86_CR4_LAM_SUP_BIT)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c
> index 46efcbd6afa4..98d0cdd82574 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c
> @@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_dep cpuid_deps[] = {
> { X86_FEATURE_SHSTK, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES },
> { X86_FEATURE_FRED, X86_FEATURE_LKGS },
> { X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL },
> + { X86_FEATURE_LASS, X86_FEATURE_SMAP },
> {}
> };
>
> diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> index ee176236c2be..4473a6f7800b 100644
> --- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> +++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> @@ -313,6 +313,7 @@
> #define X86_FEATURE_SM4 (12*32+ 2) /* SM4 instructions */
> #define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI (12*32+ 4) /* "avx_vnni" AVX VNNI instructions */
> #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BF16 (12*32+ 5) /* "avx512_bf16" AVX512 BFLOAT16 instructions */
> +#define X86_FEATURE_LASS (12*32+ 6) /* "lass" Linear Address Space Separation */
> #define X86_FEATURE_CMPCCXADD (12*32+ 7) /* CMPccXADD instructions */
> #define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_PERFMON_EXT (12*32+ 8) /* Intel Architectural PerfMon Extension */
> #define X86_FEATURE_FZRM (12*32+10) /* Fast zero-length REP MOVSB */
Reviewed-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@...or.com>
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