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Message-ID: <175092899935.406.14417210191129837726.tip-bot2@tip-bot2>
Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2025 09:09:59 -0000
From: "tip-bot2 for David Kaplan" <tip-bot2@...utronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@...r.kernel.org
Cc: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@....com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
"Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@...en8.de>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, x86@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [tip: x86/bugs] x86/bugs: Use IBPB for retbleed if used by SRSO
The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:
Commit-ID: ff54ae7314962699749869a3475da7a702ae991a
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/ff54ae7314962699749869a3475da7a702ae991a
Author: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@....com>
AuthorDate: Wed, 25 Jun 2025 10:58:04 -05:00
Committer: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
CommitterDate: Thu, 26 Jun 2025 10:56:39 +02:00
x86/bugs: Use IBPB for retbleed if used by SRSO
If spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb then this mitigates retbleed as well. This
is relevant for AMD Zen1 and Zen2 CPUs which are vulnerable to both bugs.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@....com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@...en8.de>
Cc: H . Peter Anvin <hpa@...or.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>
Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250625155805.600376-3-david.kaplan@amd.com
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++---------------
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 6c991af..b263419 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1171,6 +1171,21 @@ static enum retbleed_mitigation retbleed_mitigation __ro_after_init =
static int __ro_after_init retbleed_nosmt = false;
+enum srso_mitigation {
+ SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE,
+ SRSO_MITIGATION_AUTO,
+ SRSO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
+ SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET_UCODE_NEEDED,
+ SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE,
+ SRSO_MITIGATION_NOSMT,
+ SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET,
+ SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB,
+ SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT,
+ SRSO_MITIGATION_BP_SPEC_REDUCE,
+};
+
+static enum srso_mitigation srso_mitigation __ro_after_init = SRSO_MITIGATION_AUTO;
+
static int __init retbleed_parse_cmdline(char *str)
{
if (!str)
@@ -1280,6 +1295,10 @@ static void __init retbleed_update_mitigation(void)
if (its_mitigation == ITS_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE_STUFF)
retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF;
+ /* If SRSO is using IBPB, that works for retbleed too */
+ if (srso_mitigation == SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB)
+ retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB;
+
if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF &&
!cdt_possible(spectre_v2_enabled)) {
pr_err("WARNING: retbleed=stuff depends on retpoline\n");
@@ -2845,19 +2864,6 @@ early_param("l1tf", l1tf_cmdline);
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Speculative Return Stack Overflow: " fmt
-enum srso_mitigation {
- SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE,
- SRSO_MITIGATION_AUTO,
- SRSO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
- SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET_UCODE_NEEDED,
- SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE,
- SRSO_MITIGATION_NOSMT,
- SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET,
- SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB,
- SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT,
- SRSO_MITIGATION_BP_SPEC_REDUCE,
-};
-
static const char * const srso_strings[] = {
[SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable",
[SRSO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED] = "Vulnerable: No microcode",
@@ -2870,8 +2876,6 @@ static const char * const srso_strings[] = {
[SRSO_MITIGATION_BP_SPEC_REDUCE] = "Mitigation: Reduced Speculation"
};
-static enum srso_mitigation srso_mitigation __ro_after_init = SRSO_MITIGATION_AUTO;
-
static int __init srso_parse_cmdline(char *str)
{
if (!str)
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