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Message-ID: <175092900020.406.6486511755076508456.tip-bot2@tip-bot2>
Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2025 09:10:00 -0000
From: "tip-bot2 for David Kaplan" <tip-bot2@...utronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@...r.kernel.org
Cc: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@....com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
"Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@...en8.de>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, x86@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [tip: x86/bugs] x86/bugs: Add SRSO_MITIGATION_NOSMT
The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 1fd5eb02867ac7db9144bd44c8edfad0189c8e57
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/1fd5eb02867ac7db9144bd44c8edfad0189c8e57
Author: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@....com>
AuthorDate: Wed, 25 Jun 2025 10:58:03 -05:00
Committer: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
CommitterDate: Thu, 26 Jun 2025 10:56:39 +02:00
x86/bugs: Add SRSO_MITIGATION_NOSMT
AMD Zen1 and Zen2 CPUs with SMT disabled are not vulnerable to SRSO.
Instead of overloading the X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO bit to indicate this,
define a separate mitigation to make the code cleaner.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@....com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@...en8.de>
Cc: H . Peter Anvin <hpa@...or.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>
Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250625155805.600376-2-david.kaplan@amd.com
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 11 ++++-------
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index bdef2c9..6c991af 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -2851,6 +2851,7 @@ enum srso_mitigation {
SRSO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET_UCODE_NEEDED,
SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE,
+ SRSO_MITIGATION_NOSMT,
SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET,
SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB,
SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT,
@@ -2862,6 +2863,7 @@ static const char * const srso_strings[] = {
[SRSO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED] = "Vulnerable: No microcode",
[SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET_UCODE_NEEDED] = "Vulnerable: Safe RET, no microcode",
[SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE] = "Vulnerable: Microcode, no safe RET",
+ [SRSO_MITIGATION_NOSMT] = "Mitigation: SMT disabled",
[SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET] = "Mitigation: Safe RET",
[SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB] = "Mitigation: IBPB",
[SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT] = "Mitigation: IBPB on VMEXIT only",
@@ -2914,8 +2916,7 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
* IBPB microcode has been applied.
*/
if (boot_cpu_data.x86 < 0x19 && !cpu_smt_possible()) {
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO);
- srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE;
+ srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_NOSMT;
return;
}
} else {
@@ -2968,8 +2969,7 @@ static void __init srso_update_mitigation(void)
srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB;
if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO) &&
- !cpu_mitigations_off() &&
- !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO))
+ !cpu_mitigations_off())
pr_info("%s\n", srso_strings[srso_mitigation]);
}
@@ -3265,9 +3265,6 @@ static ssize_t retbleed_show_state(char *buf)
static ssize_t srso_show_state(char *buf)
{
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO))
- return sysfs_emit(buf, "Mitigation: SMT disabled\n");
-
return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", srso_strings[srso_mitigation]);
}
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