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Message-ID: <175094287763.406.9381570505281070631.tip-bot2@tip-bot2>
Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2025 13:01:17 -0000
From: "tip-bot2 for David Kaplan" <tip-bot2@...utronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@...r.kernel.org
Cc: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@....com>,
"Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@...en8.de>, x86@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [tip: x86/bugs] x86/bugs: Clean up SRSO microcode handling
The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 98b5dab4d22181c931f2bf63c060416badbb49ab
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/98b5dab4d22181c931f2bf63c060416badbb49ab
Author: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@....com>
AuthorDate: Wed, 25 Jun 2025 10:58:05 -05:00
Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@...en8.de>
CommitterDate: Thu, 26 Jun 2025 13:32:31 +02:00
x86/bugs: Clean up SRSO microcode handling
SRSO microcode only exists for Zen3/Zen4 CPUs. For those CPUs, the microcode
is required for any mitigation other than Safe-RET to be effective. Safe-RET
can still protect user->kernel and guest->host attacks without microcode.
Clarify this in the code and ensure that SRSO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED is
selected for any mitigation besides Safe-RET if the required microcode isn't
present.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@....com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@...en8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250625155805.600376-4-david.kaplan@amd.com
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index b263419..e2a8a21 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -2902,8 +2902,6 @@ early_param("spec_rstack_overflow", srso_parse_cmdline);
static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
{
- bool has_microcode;
-
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO) || cpu_mitigations_off())
srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE;
@@ -2913,23 +2911,30 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
if (srso_mitigation == SRSO_MITIGATION_AUTO)
srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET;
- has_microcode = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE);
- if (has_microcode) {
- /*
- * Zen1/2 with SMT off aren't vulnerable after the right
- * IBPB microcode has been applied.
- */
- if (boot_cpu_data.x86 < 0x19 && !cpu_smt_possible()) {
- srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_NOSMT;
- return;
- }
- } else {
+ /* Zen1/2 with SMT off aren't vulnerable to SRSO. */
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86 < 0x19 && !cpu_smt_possible()) {
+ srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_NOSMT;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE)) {
pr_warn("IBPB-extending microcode not applied!\n");
pr_warn(SRSO_NOTICE);
+
+ /*
+ * Safe-RET provides partial mitigation without microcode, but
+ * other mitigations require microcode to provide any
+ * mitigations.
+ */
+ if (srso_mitigation == SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET)
+ srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET_UCODE_NEEDED;
+ else
+ srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
}
switch (srso_mitigation) {
case SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET:
+ case SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET_UCODE_NEEDED:
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO)) {
srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT;
goto ibpb_on_vmexit;
@@ -2939,9 +2944,6 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_SRSO.\n");
srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE;
}
-
- if (!has_microcode)
- srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET_UCODE_NEEDED;
break;
ibpb_on_vmexit:
case SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT:
@@ -2956,9 +2958,6 @@ ibpb_on_vmexit:
pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE;
}
-
- if (!has_microcode)
- srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
break;
default:
break;
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