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Message-ID: <85jz49x31p.fsf@amd.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2025 08:37:38 +0000
From: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@....com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
CC: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
<x86@...nel.org>, <tglx@...utronix.de>, <mingo@...hat.com>,
<dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, <santosh.shukla@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/sev: Improve handling of writes to intercepted
GUEST_TSC_FREQ
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com> writes:
> On Mon, Jul 14, 2025, Borislav Petkov wrote:
>> On Mon, Jul 14, 2025 at 08:17:13AM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>>
>> The original text in the patch:
>>
>> "Only terminate the guest when reading from intercepted GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR
>> with Secure TSC enabled, as this indicates an unexpected hypervisor
>> configuration."
>>
>> doesn't make too much sense to me.
>>
>> Maybe you need to explain things in detail as virt and I don't understand each
>> other too much yet.
How about the below changelog:
Currently, when a Secure TSC enabled SNP guest attempts to write to
the intercepted GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR (a read-only MSR), the guest kernel
#VC handler terminates the SNP guest by returning ES_VMM_ERROR. This
response incorrectly implies a VMM configuration error, when in fact
it's a valid VMM configuration to intercept writes to read-only MSRs,
unless explicitly documented.
Modify the intercepted GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR #VC handler to ignore writes
instead of terminating the guest. Since GUEST_TSC_FREQ is a guest-only
MSR, ignoring writes directly (rather than forwarding to the VMM and
handling the resulting #GP) eliminates a round trip to the VMM. Add a
WARN_ONCE to log the incident, as well-behaved guest kernels should
never attempt to write to this read-only MSR.
However, continue to terminate the guest(via ES_VMM_ERROR) when
reading from intercepted GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR with Secure TSC enabled,
as intercepted reads indicate an improper VMM configuration for Secure
TSC enabled SNP guests.
Regards,
Nikunj
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