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Message-ID: <20250715083827.GBaHYTg9eU55LcHKR1@fat_crate.local>
Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2025 10:38:27 +0200
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@....com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
x86@...nel.org, tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com,
dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, santosh.shukla@....com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/sev: Improve handling of writes to intercepted
GUEST_TSC_FREQ
On Mon, Jul 14, 2025 at 09:36:04AM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> Or as Tom suggested, return ES_EXCEPTION and let the kernel's normal machinery
> WARN on the bad WRMSR.
Ack.
> Because as you note below, the MSR read should succeed. __vc_handle_secure_tsc_msrs()
> is invoked if and only if secure TSC is enabled for the guest. If RDMSR #VCs,
> then the hypervisor has decided to intercept GUEST_TSC_FREQ despite enabling and
> advertising secure TSC to the guest. The guest kernel can either continue on
> with degraded security (potentially dangerously so) or panic/terminate.
Aha, I guess we do want to panic here...
> > The APM says:
> >
> > "Guests that run with Secure TSC enabled may read the GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR
> > (C001_0134h) which returns the effective frequency in MHz of the guest view of
> > TSC. This MSR is read-only and attempting to write the MSR or read it when
> > outside of a guest with Secure TSC enabled causes a #GP(0) exception."
> >
> > So what is the established protocol for reading non-existent MSRs?
>
> Looks like Linux-as-a-guest will request emulation from the hypervisor. What
> the hypervisor does is completely unknown, at least as far as the guest is
> concerned. E.g. the hypervisor could return an error (i.e. "inject" a #GP), or
> it could provide garbage (on RDMSR) and drop writres.
I see.
Thx.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
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