Message-ID: <20250801184026.GB1274@sol>
Date: Fri, 1 Aug 2025 11:40:26 -0700
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
To: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>
Cc: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@....de>, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
	linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...pe.ca>,
	linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] tpm: Compare HMAC values in constant time

On Fri, Aug 01, 2025 at 02:03:47PM -0400, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Fri, 2025-08-01 at 10:11 -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> > On Fri, Aug 01, 2025 at 07:36:02AM -0400, James Bottomley wrote:
> > > On Thu, 2025-07-31 at 20:02 -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> > > > On Thu, Jul 31, 2025 at 10:28:49PM -0400, James Bottomley wrote:
> > > > > On Thu, 2025-07-31 at 14:52 -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> > > > > > To prevent timing attacks, HMAC value comparison needs to be
> > > > > > constant time.  Replace the memcmp() with the correct
> > > > > > function, crypto_memneq().
> > > > > 
> > > > > Um, OK, I'm all for more security but how could there possibly
> > > > > be a timing attack in the hmac final comparison code?  All it's
> > > > > doing is seeing if the HMAC the TPM returns matches the
> > > > > calculated one.  Beyond this calculation, there's nothing
> > > > > secret about the HMAC key.
> > > > 
> > > > I'm not sure I understand your question.  Timing attacks on MAC
> > > > validation are a well-known issue that can allow a valid MAC to
> > > > be guessed without knowing the key.  Whether it's practical in
> > > > this particular case for some architecture+compiler+kconfig
> > > > combination is another question, but there's no reason not to use
> > > > the constant-time comparison function that solves this problem.
> > > > 
> > > > Is your claim that in this case the key is public, so the MAC
> > > > really just serves as a checksum (and thus the wrong primitive is
> > > > being used)?
> > > 
> > > The keys used for TPM HMAC calculations are all derived from a
> > > shared secret and updating parameters making them one time ones
> > > which are never reused, so there's no benefit to an attacker
> > > working out after the fact what the key was.
> > 
> > MAC timing attacks forge MACs; they don't leak the key.
> 
> > It's true that such attacks don't work with one-time keys.  But here
> > it's not necessarily a one-time key.  E.g., tpm2_get_random() sets a
> > key, then authenticates multiple messages using that key.
> 
> The nonces come one from us and one from the TPM.  I think ours doesn't
> change if the session is continued although it could, whereas the TPM
> one does, so the HMAC key is different for every communication of a
> continued session.

Again, tpm2_get_random() sets a HMAC key once and then uses it multiple
times.

> > I guses I'm struggling to understand the point of your comments.
> 
> Your commit message, still quoted above, begins "To prevent timing
> attacks ..." but I still don't think there are any viable timing
> attacks against this code.  However, that statement gives the idea that
> it's fixing a crypto vulnerablility and thus is going to excite the AI
> based CVE producers.
> 
> >   Even if in a follow-up message you're finally able to present a
> > correct argument for why memcmp() is okay, it's clearly subtle enough
> > that we should just use crypto_memneq() anyway, just like everywhere
> > else in the kernel that validates MACs.  If you're worried about
> > performance, you shouldn't be: it's a negligible difference that is
> > far outweighed by all the optimizations I've been making to
> > lib/crypto/.
> 
> So if you change the justification to something like "crypto people
> would like to update hmac compares to be constant time everywhere to
> avoid having to check individual places for correctness" I think I'd be
> happy.

Sure, provided that memcmp() is actually secure here.  So far, it hasn't
been particularly convincing when each argument you've given for it
being secure has been incorrect.

But I do see that each call to tpm_buf_check_hmac_response() is paired
with a call to tpm_buf_append_hmac_session() which generates a fresh
nonce.  That nonce is then sent to the other endpoint (the one that
claims to be a TPM) and then implicitly becomes part of the response
message (but is not explicitly transmitted back in it).  That may be the
real reason: messages are guaranteed to not be repeated, so a MAC timing
attack can't be done.  Do you agree that is the actual reason?

- Eric

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