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Message-ID: <321c09c7cb2edb113ce9a829d37c0ae5c835e17f.camel@HansenPartnership.com>
Date: Fri, 01 Aug 2025 14:53:09 -0400
From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
Cc: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@....de>, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...pe.ca>,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] tpm: Compare HMAC values in constant time
On Fri, 2025-08-01 at 11:40 -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 01, 2025 at 02:03:47PM -0400, James Bottomley wrote:
> > On Fri, 2025-08-01 at 10:11 -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
[...]
> > > It's true that such attacks don't work with one-time keys. But
> > > here it's not necessarily a one-time key. E.g.,
> > > tpm2_get_random() sets a key, then authenticates multiple
> > > messages using that key.
> >
> > The nonces come one from us and one from the TPM. I think ours
> > doesn't change if the session is continued although it could,
> > whereas the TPM one does, so the HMAC key is different for every
> > communication of a continued session.
>
> Again, tpm2_get_random() sets a HMAC key once and then uses it
> multiple times.
No it doesn't. If you actually read the code, you'd find it does what
I say above. Specifically tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session() which is called
inside that loop recalculates the hmac key from the nonces. This
recalculated key is what is used in tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(), and
which is where the new tpm nonce is collected for the next iteration.
Regards,
James
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