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Message-ID: <aJILqzhBKLMYF0P4@kernel.org>
Date: Tue, 5 Aug 2025 16:48:27 +0300
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] KEYS: trusted_tpm1: Move private functionality out
of public header
On Thu, Jul 31, 2025 at 02:23:54PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> Move functionality used only by trusted_tpm1.c out of the public header
> <keys/trusted_tpm.h>. Specifically, change the exported functions into
> static functions, since they are not used outside trusted_tpm1.c, and
> move various other definitions and inline functions to trusted_tpm1.c.
>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
> ---
> include/keys/trusted_tpm.h | 79 ----------------------
> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 80 ++++++++++++++++++++---
> 2 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 87 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
> index a088b33fd0e3b..0fadc6a4f1663 100644
> --- a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
> +++ b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
> @@ -3,94 +3,15 @@
> #define __TRUSTED_TPM_H
>
> #include <keys/trusted-type.h>
> #include <linux/tpm_command.h>
>
> -/* implementation specific TPM constants */
> -#define TPM_SIZE_OFFSET 2
> -#define TPM_RETURN_OFFSET 6
> -#define TPM_DATA_OFFSET 10
> -
> -#define LOAD32(buffer, offset) (ntohl(*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset]))
> -#define LOAD32N(buffer, offset) (*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset])
> -#define LOAD16(buffer, offset) (ntohs(*(uint16_t *)&buffer[offset]))
> -
> extern struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tpm_ops;
>
> -struct osapsess {
> - uint32_t handle;
> - unsigned char secret[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
> - unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
> -};
> -
> -/* discrete values, but have to store in uint16_t for TPM use */
> -enum {
> - SEAL_keytype = 1,
> - SRK_keytype = 4
> -};
> -
> -int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
> - unsigned int keylen, unsigned char *h1,
> - unsigned char *h2, unsigned int h3, ...);
> -int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,
> - const uint32_t command,
> - const unsigned char *ononce,
> - const unsigned char *key,
> - unsigned int keylen, ...);
> -
> -int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen);
> -int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce);
> -
> int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
> struct trusted_key_options *options);
> int tpm2_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
> struct trusted_key_options *options);
>
> -#define TPM_DEBUG 0
> -
> -#if TPM_DEBUG
> -static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
> -{
> - pr_info("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype);
> - pr_info("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle);
> - pr_info("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock);
> - pr_info("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len);
> - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
> - 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0);
> -}
> -
> -static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
> -{
> - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "trusted-key: handle ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
> - 16, 1, &s->handle, 4, 0);
> - pr_info("secret:\n");
> - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
> - 16, 1, &s->secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
> - pr_info("trusted-key: enonce:\n");
> - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
> - 16, 1, &s->enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
> -}
> -
> -static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf)
> -{
> - int len;
> -
> - pr_info("\ntpm buffer\n");
> - len = LOAD32(buf, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET);
> - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, buf, len, 0);
> -}
> -#else
> -static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
> -{
> -}
> -
> -static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
> -{
> -}
> -
> -static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf)
> -{
> -}
> -#endif
> #endif
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
> index 126437459a74d..636acb66a4f69 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
> @@ -22,10 +22,78 @@
> #include <keys/trusted_tpm.h>
>
> static struct tpm_chip *chip;
> static struct tpm_digest *digests;
>
> +/* implementation specific TPM constants */
> +#define TPM_SIZE_OFFSET 2
> +#define TPM_RETURN_OFFSET 6
> +#define TPM_DATA_OFFSET 10
> +
> +#define LOAD32(buffer, offset) (ntohl(*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset]))
> +#define LOAD32N(buffer, offset) (*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset])
> +#define LOAD16(buffer, offset) (ntohs(*(uint16_t *)&buffer[offset]))
> +
> +struct osapsess {
> + uint32_t handle;
> + unsigned char secret[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
> + unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
> +};
> +
> +/* discrete values, but have to store in uint16_t for TPM use */
> +enum {
> + SEAL_keytype = 1,
> + SRK_keytype = 4
> +};
> +
> +#define TPM_DEBUG 0
> +
> +#if TPM_DEBUG
> +static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
> +{
> + pr_info("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype);
> + pr_info("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle);
> + pr_info("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock);
> + pr_info("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len);
> + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
> + 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0);
> +}
> +
> +static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
> +{
> + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "trusted-key: handle ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
> + 16, 1, &s->handle, 4, 0);
> + pr_info("secret:\n");
> + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
> + 16, 1, &s->secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
> + pr_info("trusted-key: enonce:\n");
> + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
> + 16, 1, &s->enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
> +}
> +
> +static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf)
> +{
> + int len;
> +
> + pr_info("\ntpm buffer\n");
> + len = LOAD32(buf, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET);
> + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, buf, len, 0);
> +}
> +#else
> +static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
> +{
> +}
> +
> +static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
> +{
> +}
> +
> +static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf)
> +{
> +}
> +#endif
> +
> static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
> unsigned int keylen, ...)
> {
> struct hmac_sha1_ctx hmac_ctx;
> va_list argp;
> @@ -54,11 +122,11 @@ static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
> }
>
> /*
> * calculate authorization info fields to send to TPM
> */
> -int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
> +static int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
> unsigned int keylen, unsigned char *h1,
> unsigned char *h2, unsigned int h3, ...)
> {
> unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
> struct sha1_ctx sha_ctx;
> @@ -92,16 +160,15 @@ int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
> ret = TSS_rawhmac(digest, key, keylen, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
> paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h1,
> TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h2, 1, &c, 0, 0);
> return ret;
> }
> -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(TSS_authhmac);
>
> /*
> * verify the AUTH1_COMMAND (Seal) result from TPM
> */
> -int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,
> +static int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,
> const uint32_t command,
> const unsigned char *ononce,
> const unsigned char *key,
> unsigned int keylen, ...)
> {
> @@ -157,11 +224,10 @@ int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,
>
> if (crypto_memneq(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
> return -EINVAL;
> return 0;
> }
> -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(TSS_checkhmac1);
>
> /*
> * verify the AUTH2_COMMAND (unseal) result from TPM
> */
> static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer,
> @@ -242,11 +308,11 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer,
>
> /*
> * For key specific tpm requests, we will generate and send our
> * own TPM command packets using the drivers send function.
> */
> -int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen)
> +static int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen)
> {
> struct tpm_buf buf;
> int rc;
>
> if (!chip)
> @@ -268,11 +334,10 @@ int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen)
> rc = -EPERM;
>
> tpm_put_ops(chip);
> return rc;
> }
> -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(trusted_tpm_send);
>
> /*
> * Lock a trusted key, by extending a selected PCR.
> *
> * Prevents a trusted key that is sealed to PCRs from being accessed.
> @@ -322,11 +387,11 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s,
> }
>
> /*
> * Create an object independent authorisation protocol (oiap) session
> */
> -int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce)
> +static int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce)
> {
> int ret;
>
> if (!chip)
> return -ENODEV;
> @@ -339,11 +404,10 @@ int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce)
> *handle = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET);
> memcpy(nonce, &tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t)],
> TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
> return 0;
> }
> -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(oiap);
>
> struct tpm_digests {
> unsigned char encauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
> unsigned char pubauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
> unsigned char xorwork[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2];
> --
> 2.50.1
>
IMHO, this could followed (as next logical steps):
1. Get rid of LOAD*() (tpm_buf_read*)
2. I think we should delete dump_* given modern times and countless ways
to acquire that data (e.g., with eBPF).
BR, Jarkko
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