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Message-ID: <aJIMVq2FNPpH0KUL@kernel.org>
Date: Tue, 5 Aug 2025 16:51:26 +0300
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
Cc: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@....de>, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...pe.ca>,
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] tpm: Use HMAC-SHA256 library instead of
open-coded HMAC
On Fri, Aug 01, 2025 at 02:24:22PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> Now that there are easy-to-use HMAC-SHA256 library functions, use these
> in tpm2-sessions.c instead of open-coding the HMAC algorithm.
>
> Note that the new implementation correctly handles keys longer than 64
> bytes (SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE), whereas the old implementation handled such
> keys incorrectly. But it doesn't appear that such keys were being used.
>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
> ---
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 98 +++++++++-----------------------
> 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> index 5fbd62ee50903..6d03c224e6b21 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> @@ -67,12 +67,11 @@
> #include <linux/random.h>
> #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
> #include <linux/unaligned.h>
> #include <crypto/kpp.h>
> #include <crypto/ecdh.h>
> -#include <crypto/hash.h>
> -#include <crypto/hmac.h>
> +#include <crypto/sha2.h>
> #include <crypto/utils.h>
>
> /* maximum number of names the TPM must remember for authorization */
> #define AUTH_MAX_NAMES 3
>
> @@ -383,55 +382,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_hmac_session);
> #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
>
> static int tpm2_create_primary(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 hierarchy,
> u32 *handle, u8 *name);
>
> -/*
> - * It turns out the crypto hmac(sha256) is hard for us to consume
> - * because it assumes a fixed key and the TPM seems to change the key
> - * on every operation, so we weld the hmac init and final functions in
> - * here to give it the same usage characteristics as a regular hash
> - */
> -static void tpm2_hmac_init(struct sha256_ctx *sctx, u8 *key, u32 key_len)
> -{
> - u8 pad[SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE];
> - int i;
> -
> - sha256_init(sctx);
> - for (i = 0; i < sizeof(pad); i++) {
> - if (i < key_len)
> - pad[i] = key[i];
> - else
> - pad[i] = 0;
> - pad[i] ^= HMAC_IPAD_VALUE;
> - }
> - sha256_update(sctx, pad, sizeof(pad));
> -}
> -
> -static void tpm2_hmac_final(struct sha256_ctx *sctx, u8 *key, u32 key_len,
> - u8 *out)
> -{
> - u8 pad[SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE];
> - int i;
> -
> - for (i = 0; i < sizeof(pad); i++) {
> - if (i < key_len)
> - pad[i] = key[i];
> - else
> - pad[i] = 0;
> - pad[i] ^= HMAC_OPAD_VALUE;
> - }
> -
> - /* collect the final hash; use out as temporary storage */
> - sha256_final(sctx, out);
> -
> - sha256_init(sctx);
> - sha256_update(sctx, pad, sizeof(pad));
> - sha256_update(sctx, out, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
> - sha256_final(sctx, out);
> -}
> -
> /*
> * assume hash sha256 and nonces u, v of size SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE but
> * otherwise standard tpm2_KDFa. Note output is in bytes not bits.
> */
> static void tpm2_KDFa(u8 *key, u32 key_len, const char *label, u8 *u,
> @@ -439,20 +393,20 @@ static void tpm2_KDFa(u8 *key, u32 key_len, const char *label, u8 *u,
> {
> u32 counter = 1;
> const __be32 bits = cpu_to_be32(bytes * 8);
>
> while (bytes > 0) {
> - struct sha256_ctx sctx;
> + struct hmac_sha256_ctx hctx;
> __be32 c = cpu_to_be32(counter);
>
> - tpm2_hmac_init(&sctx, key, key_len);
> - sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)&c, sizeof(c));
> - sha256_update(&sctx, label, strlen(label)+1);
> - sha256_update(&sctx, u, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
> - sha256_update(&sctx, v, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
> - sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)&bits, sizeof(bits));
> - tpm2_hmac_final(&sctx, key, key_len, out);
> + hmac_sha256_init_usingrawkey(&hctx, key, key_len);
> + hmac_sha256_update(&hctx, (u8 *)&c, sizeof(c));
> + hmac_sha256_update(&hctx, label, strlen(label) + 1);
> + hmac_sha256_update(&hctx, u, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
> + hmac_sha256_update(&hctx, v, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
> + hmac_sha256_update(&hctx, (u8 *)&bits, sizeof(bits));
> + hmac_sha256_final(&hctx, out);
>
> bytes -= SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
> counter++;
> out += SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
> }
> @@ -592,10 +546,11 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf)
> off_t offset_s = TPM_HEADER_SIZE, offset_p;
> u8 *hmac = NULL;
> u32 attrs;
> u8 cphash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
> struct sha256_ctx sctx;
> + struct hmac_sha256_ctx hctx;
>
> if (!auth)
> return;
>
> /* save the command code in BE format */
> @@ -703,18 +658,18 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf)
> sha256_update(&sctx, &buf->data[offset_s],
> tpm_buf_length(buf) - offset_s);
> sha256_final(&sctx, cphash);
>
> /* now calculate the hmac */
> - tpm2_hmac_init(&sctx, auth->session_key, sizeof(auth->session_key)
> - + auth->passphrase_len);
> - sha256_update(&sctx, cphash, sizeof(cphash));
> - sha256_update(&sctx, auth->our_nonce, sizeof(auth->our_nonce));
> - sha256_update(&sctx, auth->tpm_nonce, sizeof(auth->tpm_nonce));
> - sha256_update(&sctx, &auth->attrs, 1);
> - tpm2_hmac_final(&sctx, auth->session_key, sizeof(auth->session_key)
> - + auth->passphrase_len, hmac);
> + hmac_sha256_init_usingrawkey(&hctx, auth->session_key,
> + sizeof(auth->session_key) +
> + auth->passphrase_len);
> + hmac_sha256_update(&hctx, cphash, sizeof(cphash));
> + hmac_sha256_update(&hctx, auth->our_nonce, sizeof(auth->our_nonce));
> + hmac_sha256_update(&hctx, auth->tpm_nonce, sizeof(auth->tpm_nonce));
> + hmac_sha256_update(&hctx, &auth->attrs, 1);
> + hmac_sha256_final(&hctx, hmac);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session);
>
> /**
> * tpm_buf_check_hmac_response() - check the TPM return HMAC for correctness
> @@ -750,10 +705,11 @@ int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
> struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth;
> off_t offset_s, offset_p;
> u8 rphash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
> u32 attrs, cc;
> struct sha256_ctx sctx;
> + struct hmac_sha256_ctx hctx;
> u16 tag = be16_to_cpu(head->tag);
> int parm_len, len, i, handles;
>
> if (!auth)
> return rc;
> @@ -819,19 +775,19 @@ int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
> sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)&auth->ordinal, sizeof(auth->ordinal));
> sha256_update(&sctx, &buf->data[offset_p], parm_len);
> sha256_final(&sctx, rphash);
>
> /* now calculate the hmac */
> - tpm2_hmac_init(&sctx, auth->session_key, sizeof(auth->session_key)
> - + auth->passphrase_len);
> - sha256_update(&sctx, rphash, sizeof(rphash));
> - sha256_update(&sctx, auth->tpm_nonce, sizeof(auth->tpm_nonce));
> - sha256_update(&sctx, auth->our_nonce, sizeof(auth->our_nonce));
> - sha256_update(&sctx, &auth->attrs, 1);
> + hmac_sha256_init_usingrawkey(&hctx, auth->session_key,
> + sizeof(auth->session_key) +
> + auth->passphrase_len);
> + hmac_sha256_update(&hctx, rphash, sizeof(rphash));
> + hmac_sha256_update(&hctx, auth->tpm_nonce, sizeof(auth->tpm_nonce));
> + hmac_sha256_update(&hctx, auth->our_nonce, sizeof(auth->our_nonce));
> + hmac_sha256_update(&hctx, &auth->attrs, 1);
> /* we're done with the rphash, so put our idea of the hmac there */
> - tpm2_hmac_final(&sctx, auth->session_key, sizeof(auth->session_key)
> - + auth->passphrase_len, rphash);
> + hmac_sha256_final(&hctx, rphash);
> if (crypto_memneq(rphash, &buf->data[offset_s], SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)) {
> dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: HMAC check failed\n");
> goto out;
> }
> rc = 0;
> --
> 2.50.1
>
This good stuff, thanks!
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
BR, Jarkko
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