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Message-ID: <diqz4iui4y00.fsf@ackerleytng-ctop.c.googlers.com>
Date: Thu, 07 Aug 2025 14:34:23 -0700
From: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@...gle.com>
To: David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>, Shivank Garg <shivankg@....com>, seanjc@...gle.com, 
	vbabka@...e.cz, willy@...radead.org, akpm@...ux-foundation.org, 
	shuah@...nel.org, pbonzini@...hat.com, brauner@...nel.org, 
	viro@...iv.linux.org.uk
Cc: paul@...l-moore.com, jmorris@...ei.org, serge@...lyn.com, pvorel@...e.cz, 
	bfoster@...hat.com, tabba@...gle.com, vannapurve@...gle.com, 
	chao.gao@...el.com, bharata@....com, nikunj@....com, michael.day@....com, 
	shdhiman@....com, yan.y.zhao@...el.com, Neeraj.Upadhyay@....com, 
	thomas.lendacky@....com, michael.roth@....com, aik@....com, jgg@...dia.com, 
	kalyazin@...zon.com, peterx@...hat.com, jack@...e.cz, rppt@...nel.org, 
	hch@...radead.org, cgzones@...glemail.com, ira.weiny@...el.com, 
	rientjes@...gle.com, roypat@...zon.co.uk, ziy@...dia.com, 
	matthew.brost@...el.com, joshua.hahnjy@...il.com, rakie.kim@...com, 
	byungchul@...com, gourry@...rry.net, kent.overstreet@...ux.dev, 
	ying.huang@...ux.alibaba.com, apopple@...dia.com, chao.p.peng@...el.com, 
	amit@...radead.org, ddutile@...hat.com, dan.j.williams@...el.com, 
	ashish.kalra@....com, gshan@...hat.com, jgowans@...zon.com, 
	pankaj.gupta@....com, papaluri@....com, yuzhao@...gle.com, 
	suzuki.poulose@....com, quic_eberman@...cinc.com, 
	aneeshkumar.kizhakeveetil@....com, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org, linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev
Subject: Re: [PATCH V9 1/7] KVM: guest_memfd: Use guest mem inodes instead of
 anonymous inodes

David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com> writes:

> On 13.07.25 19:43, Shivank Garg wrote:
>> From: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@...gle.com>
>> 
>> guest_memfd's inode represents memory the guest_memfd is
>> providing. guest_memfd's file represents a struct kvm's view of that
>> memory.
>> 
>> Using a custom inode allows customization of the inode teardown
>> process via callbacks. For example, ->evict_inode() allows
>> customization of the truncation process on file close, and
>> ->destroy_inode() and ->free_inode() allow customization of the inode
>> freeing process.
>> 
>> Customizing the truncation process allows flexibility in management of
>> guest_memfd memory and customization of the inode freeing process
>> allows proper cleanup of memory metadata stored on the inode.
>> 
>> Memory metadata is more appropriately stored on the inode (as opposed
>> to the file), since the metadata is for the memory and is not unique
>> to a specific binding and struct kvm.
>> 
>> Co-developed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@...gle.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@...gle.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@...gle.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@....com>
>> ---
>
> [...]
>
>>   
>>   #include "kvm_mm.h"
>>   
>> +static struct vfsmount *kvm_gmem_mnt;
>> +
>>   struct kvm_gmem {
>>   	struct kvm *kvm;
>>   	struct xarray bindings;
>> @@ -388,9 +392,51 @@ static struct file_operations kvm_gmem_fops = {
>>   	.fallocate	= kvm_gmem_fallocate,
>>   };
>>   
>> -void kvm_gmem_init(struct module *module)
>> +static const struct super_operations kvm_gmem_super_operations = {
>> +	.statfs		= simple_statfs,
>> +};
>> +
>> +static int kvm_gmem_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
>> +{
>> +	struct pseudo_fs_context *ctx;
>> +
>> +	if (!init_pseudo(fc, GUEST_MEMFD_MAGIC))
>> +		return -ENOMEM;
>> +
>> +	ctx = fc->fs_private;
>> +	ctx->ops = &kvm_gmem_super_operations;
>
> Curious, why is that required? (secretmem doesn't have it, so I wonder)
>

Good point! pseudo_fs_fill_super() fills in a struct super_operations
which already does simple_statfs, so guest_memfd doesn't need this.

>> +
>> +	return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static struct file_system_type kvm_gmem_fs = {
>> +	.name		 = "kvm_guest_memory",
>
> It's GUEST_MEMFD_MAGIC but here "kvm_guest_memory".
>
> For secretmem it's SECRETMEM_MAGIC vs. "secretmem".
>
> So naturally, I wonder if that is to be made consistent :)
>

I'll update this to "guest_memfd" to be consistent. 

>> +	.init_fs_context = kvm_gmem_init_fs_context,
>> +	.kill_sb	 = kill_anon_super,
>> +};
>> +
>> +static int kvm_gmem_init_mount(void)
>> +{
>> +	kvm_gmem_mnt = kern_mount(&kvm_gmem_fs);
>> +
>> +	if (IS_ERR(kvm_gmem_mnt))
>> +		return PTR_ERR(kvm_gmem_mnt);
>> +
>> +	kvm_gmem_mnt->mnt_flags |= MNT_NOEXEC;
>> +	return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +int kvm_gmem_init(struct module *module)
>>   {
>>   	kvm_gmem_fops.owner = module;
>> +
>> +	return kvm_gmem_init_mount();
>> +}
>> +
>> +void kvm_gmem_exit(void)
>> +{
>> +	kern_unmount(kvm_gmem_mnt);
>> +	kvm_gmem_mnt = NULL;
>>   }
>>   
>>   static int kvm_gmem_migrate_folio(struct address_space *mapping,
>> @@ -472,11 +518,71 @@ static const struct inode_operations kvm_gmem_iops = {
>>   	.setattr	= kvm_gmem_setattr,
>>   };
>>   
>> +static struct inode *kvm_gmem_inode_make_secure_inode(const char *name,
>> +						      loff_t size, u64 flags)
>> +{
>> +	struct inode *inode;
>> +
>> +	inode = anon_inode_make_secure_inode(kvm_gmem_mnt->mnt_sb, name, NULL);
>> +	if (IS_ERR(inode))
>> +		return inode;
>> +
>> +	inode->i_private = (void *)(unsigned long)flags;
>> +	inode->i_op = &kvm_gmem_iops;
>> +	inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &kvm_gmem_aops;
>> +	inode->i_mode |= S_IFREG;
>> +	inode->i_size = size;
>> +	mapping_set_gfp_mask(inode->i_mapping, GFP_HIGHUSER);
>> +	mapping_set_inaccessible(inode->i_mapping);
>> +	/* Unmovable mappings are supposed to be marked unevictable as well. */
>> +	WARN_ON_ONCE(!mapping_unevictable(inode->i_mapping));
>> +
>> +	return inode;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static struct file *kvm_gmem_inode_create_getfile(void *priv, loff_t size,
>> +						  u64 flags)
>> +{
>> +	static const char *name = "[kvm-gmem]";
>> +	struct inode *inode;
>> +	struct file *file;
>> +	int err;
>> +
>> +	err = -ENOENT;
>> +	if (!try_module_get(kvm_gmem_fops.owner))
>> +		goto err;
>
> Curious, shouldn't there be a module_put() somewhere after this function 
> returned a file?
>

This was interesting indeed, but IIUC this is correct.

I think this flow was basically copied from __anon_inode_getfile(),
which does this try_module_get().

The corresponding module_put() is in __fput(), which calls fops_put()
and calls module_put() on the owner.

>> +
>> +	inode = kvm_gmem_inode_make_secure_inode(name, size, flags);
>> +	if (IS_ERR(inode)) {
>> +		err = PTR_ERR(inode);
>> +		goto err_put_module;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	file = alloc_file_pseudo(inode, kvm_gmem_mnt, name, O_RDWR,
>> +				 &kvm_gmem_fops);
>> +	if (IS_ERR(file)) {
>> +		err = PTR_ERR(file);
>> +		goto err_put_inode;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	file->f_flags |= O_LARGEFILE;
>> +	file->private_data = priv;
>> +
>>
>
> Nothing else jumped at me.
>

Thanks for the review!

Since we're going to submit this patch through Shivank's mempolicy
support series, I'll follow up soon by sending a replacement patch in
reply to this series so Shivank could build on top of that?

> -- 
> Cheers,
>
> David / dhildenb

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