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Message-ID: <20250826205057.GC1603531@mit.edu>
Date: Tue, 26 Aug 2025 16:50:57 -0400
From: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>
To: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
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Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/2] Add O_DENY_WRITE (complement AT_EXECVE_CHECK)
On Tue, Aug 26, 2025 at 07:47:30PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>
> Passing the AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag to execveat(2) only performs a check
> on a regular file and returns 0 if execution of this file would be
> allowed, ignoring the file format and then the related interpreter
> dependencies (e.g. ELF libraries, script’s shebang).
But if that's it, why can't the script interpreter (python, bash,
etc.) before executing the script, checks for executability via
faccessat(2) or fstat(2)?
The whole O_DONY_WRITE dicsussion seemed to imply that AT_EXECVE_CHECK
was doing more than just the executability check?
> There is no other way for user space to reliably check executability of
> files (taking into account all enforced security
> policies/configurations).
Why doesn't faccessat(2) or fstat(2) suffice? This is why having a
more substantive requirements and design doc might be helpful. It
appears you have some assumptions that perhaps other kernel developers
are not aware. I certainly seem to be missing something.....
- Ted
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