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Message-ID: <CAHC9VhSkBSyHRRimb0Br9nJD02ZN_wgDY1A7uWuMh9rXhFSuzg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 29 Aug 2025 06:56:43 -0400
From: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
To: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>
Cc: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@...gle.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, Hugh Dickins <hughd@...gle.com>,
Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@...gle.com>, Nick Kralevich <nnk@...gle.com>, Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...gle.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
selinux@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] memfd,selinux: call security_inode_init_security_anon
On Thu, Aug 28, 2025 at 9:30 AM Stephen Smalley
<stephen.smalley.work@...il.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 27, 2025 at 9:23 AM Stephen Smalley
> <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com> wrote:
> > On Mon, Aug 25, 2025 at 11:18 PM Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@...gle.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > Prior to this change, no security hooks were called at the creation of a
> > > memfd file. It means that, for SELinux as an example, it will receive
> > > the default type of the filesystem that backs the in-memory inode ...
>
> Also, we'll need a corresponding patch to define the new policy
> capability in libsepol, and will need to de-conflict with the other
> pending patches that are also trying to claim the next available
> policy capability bit (so you may end up with a different one
> upstream).
My apologies for the late reply, I have limited network access this
week and haven't yet been able to give this a proper review, but I
expect things to get back to normal next week. That said, Stephen's
comments about a test suite addition are important, and I would like
to see a test addition before merging this code both to ensure this
works on a wider range of SELinux based systems beyond Android (you
should also test this on something other than Android, e.g. a modern
Fedora system) and to provide a reliable test that we can use to test
for regressions in the future.
As far as the policy capability bit offset is concerned, don't worry
too much about that right now. Allocated magic numbers like the
policy capability bits are never really fixed until they land in an
upstream tree (technically not until they land in a proper tagged
release from Linus); if/when a patch is merged that requires a new
capability bit I simply assign it the next unused offset at the time
the patch is merged. Other approaches either end up potentially
creating holes in the capability bitmap (yuck) or creating merge
dependencies between otherwise independent pact{sets} (extra double
yuck).
--
paul-moore.com
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