linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] memfd,selinux: call security_inode_init_security

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Message-ID: <CA+zpnLeFwyCSRrQW_6hb5r3QZ3LMb1dNTKqGZ3b7gNqZQ3+OYw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 29 Aug 2025 13:17:50 +1000
From: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@...gle.com>
To: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, 
	Hugh Dickins <hughd@...gle.com>, Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@...gle.com>, Nick Kralevich <nnk@...gle.com>, 
	Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...gle.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-mm@...ck.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] memfd,selinux: call security_inode_init_security_anon

On Thu, Aug 28, 2025 at 11:30 PM Stephen Smalley
<stephen.smalley.work@...il.com> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Aug 27, 2025 at 9:23 AM Stephen Smalley
> <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, Aug 25, 2025 at 11:18 PM Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@...gle.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > Prior to this change, no security hooks were called at the creation of a
> > > memfd file. It means that, for SELinux as an example, it will receive
> > > the default type of the filesystem that backs the in-memory inode. In
> > > most cases, that would be tmpfs, but if MFD_HUGETLB is passed, it will
> > > be hugetlbfs. Both can be considered implementation details of memfd.
> > >
> > > It also means that it is not possible to differentiate between a file
> > > coming from memfd_create and a file coming from a standard tmpfs mount
> > > point.
> > >
> > > Additionally, no permission is validated at creation, which differs from
> > > the similar memfd_secret syscall.
> > >
> > > Call security_inode_init_security_anon during creation. This ensures
> > > that the file is setup similarly to other anonymous inodes. On SELinux,
> > > it means that the file will receive the security context of its task.
> > >
> > > The ability to limit fexecve on memfd has been of interest to avoid
> > > potential pitfalls where /proc/self/exe or similar would be executed
> > > [1][2]. Reuse the "execute_no_trans" and "entrypoint" access vectors,
> > > similarly to the file class. These access vectors may not make sense for
> > > the existing "anon_inode" class. Therefore, define and assign a new
> > > class "memfd_file" to support such access vectors.
> > >
> > > Guard these changes behind a new policy capability named "memfd_class".
> > >
> > > [1] https://crbug.com/1305267
> > > [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20221215001205.51969-1-jeffxu@google.com/
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@...gle.com>
> >
> > This looks good to me, but do you have a test for it, preferably via
> > patch for the selinux-testsuite?
> > See https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-testsuite/commit/023b79b8319e5fe222fb5af892c579593e1cbc50
> > for an example.

Not yet, I only tested internally on Android. Let me get a change
ready for selinux-testsuite.

> >
> > Otherwise, you can add my:
> > Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>

Thanks for the review!

>
> Also, we'll need a corresponding patch to define the new policy
> capability in libsepol, and will need to de-conflict with the other
> pending patches that are also trying to claim the next available
> policy capability bit (so you may end up with a different one
> upstream).

Ack. Thanks for the heads-up. Happy to rebase the commit if that helps.