[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <5077c390-1211-42fc-b753-2a23187cf8ca@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2025 21:46:01 +0800
From: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@...el.com>
To: Chao Gao <chao.gao@...el.com>
Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, acme@...hat.com,
bp@...en8.de, dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, hpa@...or.com,
john.allen@....com, mingo@...nel.org, mingo@...hat.com,
minipli@...ecurity.net, mlevitsk@...hat.com, namhyung@...nel.org,
pbonzini@...hat.com, prsampat@....com, rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com,
seanjc@...gle.com, shuah@...nel.org, tglx@...utronix.de,
weijiang.yang@...el.com, x86@...nel.org, xin@...or.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v14 06/22] KVM: x86: Load guest FPU state when access
XSAVE-managed MSRs
On 9/10/2025 7:18 PM, Chao Gao wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 10, 2025 at 05:37:50PM +0800, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
>> On 9/9/2025 5:39 PM, Chao Gao wrote:
>>> From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
>>>
>>> Load the guest's FPU state if userspace is accessing MSRs whose values
>>> are managed by XSAVES. Introduce two helpers, kvm_{get,set}_xstate_msr(),
>>> to facilitate access to such kind of MSRs.
>>>
>>> If MSRs supported in kvm_caps.supported_xss are passed through to guest,
>>> the guest MSRs are swapped with host's before vCPU exits to userspace and
>>> after it reenters kernel before next VM-entry.
>>>
>>> Because the modified code is also used for the KVM_GET_MSRS device ioctl(),
>>> explicitly check @vcpu is non-null before attempting to load guest state.
>>> The XSAVE-managed MSRs cannot be retrieved via the device ioctl() without
>>> loading guest FPU state (which doesn't exist).
>>>
>>> Note that guest_cpuid_has() is not queried as host userspace is allowed to
>>> access MSRs that have not been exposed to the guest, e.g. it might do
>>> KVM_SET_MSRS prior to KVM_SET_CPUID2.
>
> ...
>
>>> + bool fpu_loaded = false;
>>> int i;
>>> - for (i = 0; i < msrs->nmsrs; ++i)
>>> + for (i = 0; i < msrs->nmsrs; ++i) {
>>> + /*
>>> + * If userspace is accessing one or more XSTATE-managed MSRs,
>>> + * temporarily load the guest's FPU state so that the guest's
>>> + * MSR value(s) is resident in hardware, i.e. so that KVM can
>>> + * get/set the MSR via RDMSR/WRMSR.
>>> + */
>>> + if (vcpu && !fpu_loaded && kvm_caps.supported_xss &&
>>
>> why not check vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xss?
>
> Looks like Sean anticipated someone would ask this question.
here it determines whether to call kvm_load_guest_fpu().
- based on kvm_caps.supported_xss, it will always load guest fpu.
- based on vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xss, it depends on whether
userspace calls KVM_SET_CPUID2 and whether it enables any XSS feature.
So the difference is when no XSS feature is enabled for the VM.
In this case, if checking vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xss, it will skip
kvm_load_guest_fpu(). And it will result in GET_MSR gets usrerspace's
value and SET_MSR changes userspace's value, when MSR access is
eventually allowed in later do_msr() callback. Is my understanding
correctly?
Powered by blists - more mailing lists