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Message-ID: <20250910192605.16431-1-cgoettsche@seltendoof.de>
Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2025 21:26:05 +0200
From: Christian Göttsche <cgoettsche@...tendoof.de>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@...glemail.com>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
selinux@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] pid: use ns_capable_noaudit() when determining net sysctl permissions
From: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@...glemail.com>
The capability check should not be audited since it is only being used
to determine the inode permissions. A failed check does not indicate a
violation of security policy but, when an LSM is enabled, a denial audit
message was being generated.
The denial audit message can either lead to the capability being
unnecessarily allowed in a security policy, or being silenced potentially
masking a legitimate capability check at a later point in time.
Similar to commit d6169b0206db ("net: Use ns_capable_noaudit() when
determining net sysctl permissions")
Fixes: 7863dcc72d0f ("pid: allow pid_max to be set per pid namespace")
CC: Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>
CC: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
CC: selinux@...r.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@...glemail.com>
---
kernel/pid.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/pid.c b/kernel/pid.c
index c45a28c16cd2..d94ce0250501 100644
--- a/kernel/pid.c
+++ b/kernel/pid.c
@@ -680,7 +680,7 @@ static int pid_table_root_permissions(struct ctl_table_header *head,
container_of(head->set, struct pid_namespace, set);
int mode = table->mode;
- if (ns_capable(pidns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
+ if (ns_capable_noaudit(pidns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
uid_eq(current_euid(), make_kuid(pidns->user_ns, 0)))
mode = (mode & S_IRWXU) >> 6;
else if (in_egroup_p(make_kgid(pidns->user_ns, 0)))
--
2.51.0
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