[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <380c48c1-26ca-4a78-81fe-529fcdc56960@linux.intel.com>
Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2025 16:00:50 +0800
From: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@...ux.intel.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@...ecurity.net>, John Allen <john.allen@....com>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>, Chao Gao <chao.gao@...el.com>,
Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@...el.com>, Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@...hat.com>,
Zhang Yi Z <yi.z.zhang@...ux.intel.com>, Xin Li <xin@...or.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v16 27/51] KVM: x86: Disable support for IBT and SHSTK if
allow_smaller_maxphyaddr is true
On 9/20/2025 6:32 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> Make IBT and SHSTK virtualization mutually exclusive with "officially"
> supporting setups with guest.MAXPHYADDR < host.MAXPHYADDR, i.e. if the
> allow_smaller_maxphyaddr module param is set. Running a guest with a
> smaller MAXPHYADDR requires intercepting #PF, and can also trigger
> emulation of arbitrary instructions. Intercepting and reacting to #PFs
> doesn't play nice with SHSTK, as KVM's MMU hasn't been taught to handle
> Shadow Stack accesses, and emulating arbitrary instructions doesn't play
> nice with IBT or SHSTK, as KVM's emulator doesn't handle the various side
> effects, e.g. doesn't enforce end-branch markers or model Shadow Stack
> updates.
>
> Note, hiding IBT and SHSTK based solely on allow_smaller_maxphyaddr is
> overkill, as allow_smaller_maxphyaddr is only problematic if the guest is
> actually configured to have a smaller MAXPHYADDR. However, KVM's ABI
> doesn't provide a way to express that IBT and SHSTK may break if enabled
> in conjunction with guest.MAXPHYADDR < host.MAXPHYADDR. I.e. the
> alternative is to do nothing in KVM and instead update documentation and
> hope KVM users are thorough readers. Go with the conservative-but-correct
> approach; worst case scenario, this restriction can be dropped if there's
> a strong use case for enabling CET on hosts with allow_smaller_maxphyaddr.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@...ux.intel.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 10 ++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> index 499c86bd457e..b5c4cb13630c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> @@ -963,6 +963,16 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
> if (!tdp_enabled)
> kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
>
> + /*
> + * Disable support for IBT and SHSTK if KVM is configured to emulate
> + * accesses to reserved GPAs, as KVM's emulator doesn't support IBT or
> + * SHSTK, nor does KVM handle Shadow Stack #PFs (see above).
> + */
> + if (allow_smaller_maxphyaddr) {
> + kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
> + kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_IBT);
> + }
> +
> kvm_cpu_cap_init(CPUID_7_EDX,
> F(AVX512_4VNNIW),
> F(AVX512_4FMAPS),
Powered by blists - more mailing lists