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Message-ID: <CAO55cswTyMBsKdpn7becsY4Ry+ZUoEfgP+2Q+DkhZ090VK_-2A@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2025 12:21:34 +0200
From: Maxime Coquelin <mcoqueli@...hat.com>
To: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>
Cc: Eugenio Pérez <eperezma@...hat.com>,
Yongji Xie <xieyongji@...edance.com>, virtualization@...ts.linux.dev,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Xuan Zhuo <xuanzhuo@...ux.alibaba.com>,
Dragos Tatulea DE <dtatulea@...dia.com>, jasowang@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [RFC 1/2] virtio_net: timeout control virtqueue commands
On Tue, Oct 14, 2025 at 11:25 AM Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@...hat.com> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Oct 14, 2025 at 11:14:40AM +0200, Maxime Coquelin wrote:
> > On Tue, Oct 14, 2025 at 10:29 AM Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@...hat.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Tue, Oct 07, 2025 at 03:06:21PM +0200, Eugenio Pérez wrote:
> > > > An userland device implemented through VDUSE could take rtnl forever if
> > > > the virtio-net driver is running on top of virtio_vdpa. Let's break the
> > > > device if it does not return the buffer in a longer-than-assumible
> > > > timeout.
> > >
> > > So now I can't debug qemu with gdb because guest dies :(
> > > Let's not break valid use-cases please.
> > >
> > >
> > > Instead, solve it in vduse, probably by handling cvq within
> > > kernel.
> >
> > Would a shadow control virtqueue implementation in the VDUSE driver work?
> > It would ack systematically messages sent by the Virtio-net driver,
> > and so assume the userspace application will Ack them.
> >
> > When the userspace application handles the message, if the handling fails,
> > it somehow marks the device as broken?
> >
> > Thanks,
> > Maxime
>
> Yes but it's a bit more convoluted than just acking them.
> Once you use the buffer you can get another one and so on
> with no limit.
> One fix is to actually maintain device state in the
> kernel, update it, and then notify userspace.
I agree, this is the way to go.
Thanks for your insights,
Maxime
>
>
> > >
> > > > A less agressive path can be taken to recover the device, like only
> > > > resetting the control virtqueue. However, the state of the device after
> > > > this action is taken races, as the vq could be reset after the device
> > > > writes the OK. Leaving TODO anyway.
> > > >
> > > > Signed-off-by: Eugenio Pérez <eperezma@...hat.com>
> > > > ---
> > > > drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 10 ++++++++++
> > > > 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
> > > >
> > > > diff --git a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c
> > > > index 31bd32bdecaf..ed68ad69a019 100644
> > > > --- a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c
> > > > +++ b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c
> > > > @@ -3576,6 +3576,7 @@ static bool virtnet_send_command_reply(struct virtnet_info *vi, u8 class, u8 cmd
> > > > {
> > > > struct scatterlist *sgs[5], hdr, stat;
> > > > u32 out_num = 0, tmp, in_num = 0;
> > > > + unsigned long end_time;
> > > > bool ok;
> > > > int ret;
> > > >
> > > > @@ -3614,11 +3615,20 @@ static bool virtnet_send_command_reply(struct virtnet_info *vi, u8 class, u8 cmd
> > > >
> > > > /* Spin for a response, the kick causes an ioport write, trapping
> > > > * into the hypervisor, so the request should be handled immediately.
> > > > + *
> > > > + * Long timeout so a malicious device is not able to lock rtnl forever.
> > > > */
> > > > + end_time = jiffies + 30 * HZ;
> > > > while (!virtqueue_get_buf(vi->cvq, &tmp) &&
> > > > !virtqueue_is_broken(vi->cvq)) {
> > > > cond_resched();
> > > > cpu_relax();
> > > > +
> > > > + if (time_after(end_time, jiffies)) {
> > > > + /* TODO Reset vq if possible? */
> > > > + virtio_break_device(vi->vdev);
> > > > + break;
> > > > + }
> > > > }
> > > >
> > > > unlock:
> > > > --
> > > > 2.51.0
> > >
>
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