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Message-ID: <cnwawavsdedrp6yyylt2wqiglekwsgrofimkvh32fknj676xsh@4vyzzoky5hzd>
Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2025 08:43:07 -0700
From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>
To: "Kaplan, David" <David.Kaplan@....com>
Cc: Aaron Rainbolt <arraybolt3@...il.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Alexander Graf <graf@...zon.com>, Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 00/56] Dynamic mitigations
On Wed, Oct 15, 2025 at 01:53:31PM +0000, Kaplan, David wrote:
> > If `root` is capable of setting `mitigations=off` via this interface,
> > doesn't that somewhat defeat the purpose of denying `/proc/kcore`
> > access in lockdown confidentiality mode? Assuming one is running on a
> > CPU with some form of side-channel memory read vulnerability (which they
> > very likely are), they can turn off all mitigations, then read kernel
> > memory via one of those exploits.
> >
> > There should be a one-way switch to allow denying all further writes to
> > this interface, so that once the system's mitigations are set properly,
> > any further attempts to change them until the next reboot can be
> > prevented.
> >
>
> That's a good idea, there could be a separate mitigation_lock file
> perhaps that once written to 1 denies any further changes.
Wouldn't the enablement of lockdown mode effectively function as that
one way switch?
--
Josh
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