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Message-ID: <969d1b3a-2a82-4ff1-85c5-705c102f0f8b@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 4 Nov 2025 16:40:44 +0800
From: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@...el.com>
To: Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@...el.com>, Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kas@...nel.org>,
kvm@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org, linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
Hou Wenlong <houwenlong.hwl@...group.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 1/4] KVM: TDX: Explicitly set user-return MSRs that
*may* be clobbered by the TDX-Module
On 11/4/2025 3:06 PM, Yan Zhao wrote:
> Another nit:
> Remove the tdx_user_return_msr_update_cache() in the comment of __tdx_bringup().
>
> Or could we just invoke tdx_user_return_msr_update_cache() in
> tdx_prepare_switch_to_guest()?
No. It lacks the WRMSR operation to update the hardware value, which is
the key of this patch.
> On Mon, Nov 03, 2025 at 02:20:18PM +0800, Yan Zhao wrote:
>> On Thu, Oct 30, 2025 at 12:15:25PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>>> Set all user-return MSRs to their post-TD-exit value when preparing to run
>>> a TDX vCPU to ensure the value that KVM expects to be loaded after running
>>> the vCPU is indeed the value that's loaded in hardware. If the TDX-Module
>>> doesn't actually enter the guest, i.e. doesn't do VM-Enter, then it won't
>>> "restore" VMM state, i.e. won't clobber user-return MSRs to their expected
>>> post-run values, in which case simply updating KVM's "cached" value will
>>> effectively corrupt the cache due to hardware still holding the original
>>> value.
>> This paragraph is confusing.
>>
>> The flow for the TDX module for the user-return MSRs is:
>>
>> 1. Before entering guest, i.e., inside tdh_vp_enter(),
>> a) if VM-Enter is guaranteed to succeed, load MSRs with saved guest value;
>> b) otherwise, do nothing and return to VMM.
>>
>> 2. After VMExit, before returning to VMM,
>> save guest value and restore MSRs to default values.
>>
>>
>> Failure of tdh_vp_enter() (i.e., in case of 1.b), the hardware values of the
>> MSRs should be either host value or default value, while with
>> msrs->values[slot].curr being default value.
>>
>> As a result, the reasoning of "hardware still holding the original value" is not
>> convincing, since the original value is exactly the host value.
>>
>>> In theory, KVM could conditionally update the current user-return value if
>>> and only if tdh_vp_enter() succeeds, but in practice "success" doesn't
>>> guarantee the TDX-Module actually entered the guest, e.g. if the TDX-Module
>>> synthesizes an EPT Violation because it suspects a zero-step attack.
>>>
>>> Force-load the expected values instead of trying to decipher whether or
>>> not the TDX-Module restored/clobbered MSRs, as the risk doesn't justify
>>> the benefits. Effectively avoiding four WRMSRs once per run loop (even if
>>> the vCPU is scheduled out, user-return MSRs only need to be reloaded if
>>> the CPU exits to userspace or runs a non-TDX vCPU) is likely in the noise
>>> when amortized over all entries, given the cost of running a TDX vCPU.
>>> E.g. the cost of the WRMSRs is somewhere between ~300 and ~500 cycles,
>>> whereas the cost of a _single_ roundtrip to/from a TDX guest is thousands
>>> of cycles.
>>>
>>> Fixes: e0b4f31a3c65 ("KVM: TDX: restore user ret MSRs")
>>> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
>>> Cc: Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@...el.com>
>>> Cc: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@...el.com>
>>> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
>>> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
>>> ---
>>> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 -
>>> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 52 +++++++++++++++------------------
>>> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 1 -
>>> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 9 ------
>>> 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
>>> index 48598d017d6f..d158dfd1842e 100644
>>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
>>> @@ -2378,7 +2378,6 @@ int kvm_pv_send_ipi(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long ipi_bitmap_low,
>>> int kvm_add_user_return_msr(u32 msr);
>>> int kvm_find_user_return_msr(u32 msr);
>>> int kvm_set_user_return_msr(unsigned index, u64 val, u64 mask);
>>> -void kvm_user_return_msr_update_cache(unsigned int index, u64 val);
>>> u64 kvm_get_user_return_msr(unsigned int slot);
>>>
>>> static inline bool kvm_is_supported_user_return_msr(u32 msr)
>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
>>> index 326db9b9c567..cde91a995076 100644
>>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
>>> @@ -763,25 +763,6 @@ static bool tdx_protected_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>>> return tdx_vcpu_state_details_intr_pending(vcpu_state_details);
>>> }
>>>
>>> -/*
>>> - * Compared to vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest(), there is not much to do
>>> - * as SEAMCALL/SEAMRET calls take care of most of save and restore.
>>> - */
>>> -void tdx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>>> -{
>>> - struct vcpu_vt *vt = to_vt(vcpu);
>>> -
>>> - if (vt->guest_state_loaded)
>>> - return;
>>> -
>>> - if (likely(is_64bit_mm(current->mm)))
>>> - vt->msr_host_kernel_gs_base = current->thread.gsbase;
>>> - else
>>> - vt->msr_host_kernel_gs_base = read_msr(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE);
>>> -
>>> - vt->guest_state_loaded = true;
>>> -}
>>> -
>>> struct tdx_uret_msr {
>>> u32 msr;
>>> unsigned int slot;
>>> @@ -795,19 +776,38 @@ static struct tdx_uret_msr tdx_uret_msrs[] = {
>>> {.msr = MSR_TSC_AUX,},
>>> };
>>>
>>> -static void tdx_user_return_msr_update_cache(void)
>>> +void tdx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>>> {
>>> + struct vcpu_vt *vt = to_vt(vcpu);
>>> int i;
>>>
>>> + if (vt->guest_state_loaded)
>>> + return;
>>> +
>>> + if (likely(is_64bit_mm(current->mm)))
>>> + vt->msr_host_kernel_gs_base = current->thread.gsbase;
>>> + else
>>> + vt->msr_host_kernel_gs_base = read_msr(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE);
>>> +
>>> + vt->guest_state_loaded = true;
>>> +
>>> + /*
>>> + * Explicitly set user-return MSRs that are clobbered by the TDX-Module
>>> + * if VP.ENTER succeeds, i.e. on TD-Exit, with the values that would be
>>> + * written by the TDX-Module. Don't rely on the TDX-Module to actually
>>> + * clobber the MSRs, as the contract is poorly defined and not upheld.
>>> + * E.g. the TDX-Module will synthesize an EPT Violation without doing
>>> + * VM-Enter if it suspects a zero-step attack, and never "restore" VMM
>>> + * state.
>>> + */
>>> for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tdx_uret_msrs); i++)
>>> - kvm_user_return_msr_update_cache(tdx_uret_msrs[i].slot,
>>> - tdx_uret_msrs[i].defval);
>>> + kvm_set_user_return_msr(tdx_uret_msrs[i].slot,
>>> + tdx_uret_msrs[i].defval, -1ull);
>>> }
>>>
>>> static void tdx_prepare_switch_to_host(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>>> {
>>> struct vcpu_vt *vt = to_vt(vcpu);
>>> - struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
>>>
>>> if (!vt->guest_state_loaded)
>>> return;
>>> @@ -815,11 +815,6 @@ static void tdx_prepare_switch_to_host(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>>> ++vcpu->stat.host_state_reload;
>>> wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vt->msr_host_kernel_gs_base);
>>>
>>> - if (tdx->guest_entered) {
>>> - tdx_user_return_msr_update_cache();
>>> - tdx->guest_entered = false;
>>> - }
>>> -
>>> vt->guest_state_loaded = false;
>>> }
>>>
>>> @@ -1059,7 +1054,6 @@ fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 run_flags)
>>> update_debugctlmsr(vcpu->arch.host_debugctl);
>>>
>>> tdx_load_host_xsave_state(vcpu);
>>> - tdx->guest_entered = true;
>>>
>>> vcpu->arch.regs_avail &= TDX_REGS_AVAIL_SET;
>>>
>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
>>> index ca39a9391db1..7f258870dc41 100644
>>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
>>> @@ -67,7 +67,6 @@ struct vcpu_tdx {
>>> u64 vp_enter_ret;
>>>
>>> enum vcpu_tdx_state state;
>>> - bool guest_entered;
>>>
>>> u64 map_gpa_next;
>>> u64 map_gpa_end;
>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>>> index b4b5d2d09634..639589af7cbe 100644
>>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>>> @@ -681,15 +681,6 @@ int kvm_set_user_return_msr(unsigned slot, u64 value, u64 mask)
>>> }
>>> EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM_INTERNAL(kvm_set_user_return_msr);
>>>
>>> -void kvm_user_return_msr_update_cache(unsigned int slot, u64 value)
>>> -{
>>> - struct kvm_user_return_msrs *msrs = this_cpu_ptr(user_return_msrs);
>>> -
>>> - msrs->values[slot].curr = value;
>>> - kvm_user_return_register_notifier(msrs);
>>> -}
>>> -EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM_INTERNAL(kvm_user_return_msr_update_cache);
>>> -
>>> u64 kvm_get_user_return_msr(unsigned int slot)
>>> {
>>> return this_cpu_ptr(user_return_msrs)->values[slot].curr;
>>> --
>>> 2.51.1.930.gacf6e81ea2-goog
>>>
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