[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <adba53a05329dc8399c3bd49c7bcd5eff5e69574.camel@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 06 Nov 2025 18:35:48 +0530
From: Martin George <martinus.gpy@...il.com>
To: alistair23@...il.com, hare@...e.de, kbusch@...nel.org, axboe@...nel.dk,
hch@....de, sagi@...mberg.me, kch@...dia.com, linux-nvme@...ts.infradead.org
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] nvmet-auth: update sc_c in target host hash
calculation
On Wed, 2025-11-05 at 09:14 +1000, alistair23@...il.com wrote:
> From: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@....com>
>
> Commit 7e091add9c43 "nvme-auth: update sc_c in host response" added
> the sc_c variable to the dhchap queue context structure which is
> appropriately set during negotiate and then used in the host
> response.
>
> This breaks secure concat connections with a Linux target as the
> target
> code wasn't updated at the same time. This patch fixes this by adding
> a
> new sc_c variable to the host hash calculations.
>
> Fixes: 7e091add9c43 ("nvme-auth: update sc_c in host response")
> Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@....com>
> ---
> v2:
> - Rebase on v6.18-rc4
> - Add Fixes tag
>
> drivers/nvme/host/auth.c | 1 +
> drivers/nvme/target/auth.c | 5 +++--
> drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c | 1 +
> drivers/nvme/target/nvmet.h | 1 +
> 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c b/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c
> index a01178caf15b..19980122d3d5 100644
> --- a/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c
> +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c
> @@ -492,6 +492,7 @@ static int
> nvme_auth_dhchap_setup_host_response(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl,
> ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, buf, 2);
> if (ret)
> goto out;
> + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
> *buf = chap->sc_c;
> ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, buf, 1);
> if (ret)
This memset in host/auth.c doesn't seem to serve any purpose. Also
given your patch is intended to modify the target behavior for sc_c
handling, maybe you should restrict the patch to target side updates
alone.
All the memset cleanup in both the host/auth.c & target/auth.c should
ideally be done in a separate patch, and not part of this current
patch.
> diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/auth.c b/drivers/nvme/target/auth.c
> index 02c23998e13c..f54a1425262d 100644
> --- a/drivers/nvme/target/auth.c
> +++ b/drivers/nvme/target/auth.c
> @@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ int nvmet_auth_host_hash(struct nvmet_req *req,
> u8 *response,
> const char *hash_name;
> u8 *challenge = req->sq->dhchap_c1;
> struct nvme_dhchap_key *transformed_key;
> - u8 buf[4], sc_c = ctrl->concat ? 1 : 0;
> + u8 buf[4];
> int ret;
>
> hash_name = nvme_auth_hmac_name(ctrl->shash_id);
> @@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ int nvmet_auth_host_hash(struct nvmet_req *req,
> u8 *response,
> ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, buf, 2);
> if (ret)
> goto out;
> - *buf = sc_c;
> + *buf = req->sq->sc_c;
> ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, buf, 1);
> if (ret)
> goto out;
> @@ -378,6 +378,7 @@ int nvmet_auth_host_hash(struct nvmet_req *req,
> u8 *response,
> ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, ctrl->hostnqn, strlen(ctrl-
> >hostnqn));
> if (ret)
> goto out;
> + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
> ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, buf, 1);
> if (ret)
> goto out;
> diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c
> b/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c
> index 5d7d913927d8..16894302ebe1 100644
> --- a/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c
> +++ b/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c
> @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ static u8 nvmet_auth_negotiate(struct nvmet_req
> *req, void *d)
> data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.halen,
> data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.dhlen);
> req->sq->dhchap_tid = le16_to_cpu(data->t_id);
> + req->sq->sc_c = le16_to_cpu(data->sc_c);
Given sc_c is an unsigned 8bit int, is there really a need to make this
endian safe by calling le16_to_cpu()?
-Martin
Powered by blists - more mailing lists