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Message-ID: <aQ6EvdukQytvqK-u@zx2c4.com>
Date: Sat, 8 Nov 2025 00:46:05 +0100
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>
To: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@...utronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@....com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
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John Stultz <jstultz@...gle.com>, Stephen Boyd <sboyd@...nel.org>,
John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@...sik.fu-berlin.de>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
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Russell King <linux@...linux.org.uk>,
Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@...ux.ibm.com>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@...il.com>,
Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@...roup.eu>,
Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@...nel.org>,
WANG Xuerui <kernel@...0n.name>,
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Vasily Gorbik <gor@...ux.ibm.com>,
Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@...ux.ibm.com>,
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Shannon Nelson <sln@...main.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 19/34] random: vDSO: only access vDSO datapage after
random_init()
Hi Thomas,
I'm not a huge fan of this change:
On Thu, Nov 06, 2025 at 11:02:12AM +0100, Thomas Weißschuh wrote:
> +static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(random_vdso_is_ready);
>
> /* Control how we warn userspace. */
> static struct ratelimit_state urandom_warning =
> @@ -252,6 +253,9 @@ static void random_vdso_update_generation(unsigned long next_gen)
> if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VDSO_GETRANDOM))
> return;
>
> + if (!static_branch_likely(&random_vdso_is_ready))
> + return;
> +
> /* base_crng.generation's invalid value is ULONG_MAX, while
> * vdso_k_rng_data->generation's invalid value is 0, so add one to the
> * former to arrive at the latter. Use smp_store_release so that this
> @@ -274,6 +278,9 @@ static void random_vdso_set_ready(void)
> if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VDSO_GETRANDOM))
> return;
>
> + if (!static_branch_likely(&random_vdso_is_ready))
> + return;
> +
> WRITE_ONCE(vdso_k_rng_data->is_ready, true);
> }
>
> @@ -925,6 +932,9 @@ void __init random_init(void)
> _mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
> add_latent_entropy();
>
> + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VDSO_GETRANDOM))
> + static_branch_enable(&random_vdso_is_ready);
> +
> /*
> * If we were initialized by the cpu or bootloader before jump labels
> * or workqueues are initialized, then we should enable the static
> @@ -934,8 +944,10 @@ void __init random_init(void)
> crng_set_ready(NULL);
>
> /* Reseed if already seeded by earlier phases. */
> - if (crng_ready())
> + if (crng_ready()) {
> crng_reseed(NULL);
> + random_vdso_set_ready();
> + }
The fact that the vdso datapage is set up by the time random_init() is
called seems incredibly contingent on init details. Why not, instead,
make this a necessary part of the structure of vdso setup code, which
can actually know about what happens when? For example, one clean way of
doing that would be to make vdso_k_rng_data always valid by having it
initially point to __initdata memory, and then when it's time to
initialize the real datapage, memcpy() the __initdata memory to the new
specially allocated memory. Then we don't need the complex state
tracking that this commit and the prior one introduce.
Jason
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