lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <b4b89006e56e0d1c02e503ea3c2f2ec3a0856b04.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Wed, 19 Nov 2025 10:29:15 -0500
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
To: Coiby Xu <coxu@...hat.com>, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Karel Srot <ksrot@...hat.com>, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
        Luis
 Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>,
        Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@...e.com>, Daniel
 Gomez <da.gomez@...nel.org>,
        Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@...gle.com>,
        Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>,
        Dmitry Kasatkin	
 <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>,
        Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Fan
 Wu <wufan@...nel.org>,
        Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>,
        Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com>,
        open list	
 <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "open list:MODULE SUPPORT"	
 <linux-modules@...r.kernel.org>,
        "open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM"	
 <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        "open list:SELINUX SECURITY
 MODULE"	 <selinux@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] ima: Access decompressed kernel module to verify
 appended signature

On Wed, 2025-11-19 at 22:03 +0800, Coiby Xu wrote:
> Currently, when in-kernel module decompression (CONFIG_MODULE_DECOMPRESS)
> is enabled, IMA has no way to verify the appended module signature as it
> can't decompress the module.
> 
> Define a new kernel_read_file_id enumerate READING_MODULE_COMPRESSED so
> IMA can calculate the compressed kernel module data hash on
> READING_MODULE_COMPRESSED and defer appraising/measuring it until on
> READING_MODULE when the module has been decompressed.
> 
> Before enabling in-kernel module decompression, a kernel module in
> initramfs can still be loaded with ima_policy=secure_boot. So adjust the
> kernel module rule in secure_boot policy to allow either an IMA
> signature OR an appended signature i.e. to use
> "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig".
> 
> Reported-by: Karel Srot <ksrot@...hat.com>
> Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
> Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
> Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@...hat.com>

Thanks, Coiby!  The patch is now queued in next-integrity.

-- 
Mimi

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ