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Message-ID: <20251219223417.369278-2-eeodqql09@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2025 17:34:18 -0500
From: pip-izony <eeodqql09@...il.com>
To: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@...il.com>
Cc: Seungjin Bae <eeodqql09@...il.com>,
Kyungtae Kim <Kyungtae.Kim@...tmouth.edu>,
Sanghoon Choi <csh0052@...il.com>,
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...aro.org>,
linux-input@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] Input: ims-pcu - fix heap-buffer-overflow in ims_pcu_process_data()
From: Seungjin Bae <eeodqql09@...il.com>
The `ims_pcu_process_data()` processes incoming URB data byte by byte.
However, it fails to check if the `read_pos` index exceeds
IMS_PCU_BUF_SIZE.
If a malicious USB device sends a packet larger than IMS_PCU_BUF_SIZE,
`read_pos` will increment indefinitely. Moreover, since `read_pos` is
located immediately after `read_buf`, the attacker can overwrite
`read_pos` itself to arbitrarily control the index.
This manipulated `read_pos` is subsequently used in
`ims_pcu_handle_response()` to copy data into `cmd_buf`, leading to a
heap buffer overflow.
Specifically, an attacker can overwrite the `cmd_done.wait.head` located
at offset 136 relative to `cmd_buf` in the `ims_pcu_handle_response()`.
Consequently, when the driver calls `complete(&pcu->cmd_done)`, it
triggers a control flow hijack by using the manipulated pointer.
Fix this by adding a bounds check for `read_pos` before writing to
`read_buf`.
Fixes: 628329d524743 ("Input: add IMS Passenger Control Unit driver")
Signed-off-by: Seungjin Bae <eeodqql09@...il.com>
---
drivers/input/misc/ims-pcu.c | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/input/misc/ims-pcu.c b/drivers/input/misc/ims-pcu.c
index 4581f1c53644..402bf03ca8f6 100644
--- a/drivers/input/misc/ims-pcu.c
+++ b/drivers/input/misc/ims-pcu.c
@@ -451,7 +451,8 @@ static void ims_pcu_process_data(struct ims_pcu *pcu, struct urb *urb)
if (pcu->have_dle) {
pcu->have_dle = false;
- pcu->read_buf[pcu->read_pos++] = data;
+ if (pcu->read_pos < IMS_PCU_BUF_SIZE)
+ pcu->read_buf[pcu->read_pos++] = data;
pcu->check_sum += data;
continue;
}
@@ -491,7 +492,8 @@ static void ims_pcu_process_data(struct ims_pcu *pcu, struct urb *urb)
break;
default:
- pcu->read_buf[pcu->read_pos++] = data;
+ if (pcu->read_pos < IMS_PCU_BUF_SIZE)
+ pcu->read_buf[pcu->read_pos++] = data;
pcu->check_sum += data;
break;
}
--
2.43.0
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