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Message-ID: <hr5f6diryl6xrmszastqyyfnsfsve4uxqzee4ct7ihj6agzkmo@dm3wm2mwhg2w>
Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2025 15:36:44 -0800
From: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@...il.com>
To: pip-izony <eeodqql09@...il.com>
Cc: Kyungtae Kim <Kyungtae.Kim@...tmouth.edu>,
Sanghoon Choi <csh0052@...il.com>, Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...aro.org>,
linux-input@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Input: ims-pcu - fix heap-buffer-overflow in
ims_pcu_process_data()
Hi Seungjin,
On Fri, Dec 19, 2025 at 05:34:18PM -0500, pip-izony wrote:
> From: Seungjin Bae <eeodqql09@...il.com>
>
> The `ims_pcu_process_data()` processes incoming URB data byte by byte.
> However, it fails to check if the `read_pos` index exceeds
> IMS_PCU_BUF_SIZE.
>
> If a malicious USB device sends a packet larger than IMS_PCU_BUF_SIZE,
> `read_pos` will increment indefinitely. Moreover, since `read_pos` is
> located immediately after `read_buf`, the attacker can overwrite
> `read_pos` itself to arbitrarily control the index.
>
> This manipulated `read_pos` is subsequently used in
> `ims_pcu_handle_response()` to copy data into `cmd_buf`, leading to a
> heap buffer overflow.
>
> Specifically, an attacker can overwrite the `cmd_done.wait.head` located
> at offset 136 relative to `cmd_buf` in the `ims_pcu_handle_response()`.
> Consequently, when the driver calls `complete(&pcu->cmd_done)`, it
> triggers a control flow hijack by using the manipulated pointer.
>
> Fix this by adding a bounds check for `read_pos` before writing to
> `read_buf`.
>
> Fixes: 628329d524743 ("Input: add IMS Passenger Control Unit driver")
> Signed-off-by: Seungjin Bae <eeodqql09@...il.com>
> ---
> drivers/input/misc/ims-pcu.c | 6 ++++--
> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/input/misc/ims-pcu.c b/drivers/input/misc/ims-pcu.c
> index 4581f1c53644..402bf03ca8f6 100644
> --- a/drivers/input/misc/ims-pcu.c
> +++ b/drivers/input/misc/ims-pcu.c
> @@ -451,7 +451,8 @@ static void ims_pcu_process_data(struct ims_pcu *pcu, struct urb *urb)
>
> if (pcu->have_dle) {
> pcu->have_dle = false;
> - pcu->read_buf[pcu->read_pos++] = data;
> + if (pcu->read_pos < IMS_PCU_BUF_SIZE)
> + pcu->read_buf[pcu->read_pos++] = data;
I think we might want a warning if we're overflowing the buffer.
> pcu->check_sum += data;
I don't think we should be adding the discarded bytes to the checksum.
Or maybe we should reset the state of the parser, discarding bad (too
large) packet.
> continue;
> }
> @@ -491,7 +492,8 @@ static void ims_pcu_process_data(struct ims_pcu *pcu, struct urb *urb)
> break;
>
> default:
> - pcu->read_buf[pcu->read_pos++] = data;
> + if (pcu->read_pos < IMS_PCU_BUF_SIZE)
> + pcu->read_buf[pcu->read_pos++] = data;
> pcu->check_sum += data;
> break;
> }
Thanks.
--
Dmitry
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