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Message-ID: <20251227125703.80908-1-lukas.gerlach@cispa.de>
Date: Sat, 27 Dec 2025 13:57:03 +0100
From: Lukas Gerlach <lukas.gerlach@...pa.de>
To: Deepak Gupta <debug@...osinc.com>
CC: <linux-riscv@...ts.infradead.org>, <palmer@...belt.com>, <pjw@...nel.org>,
<aou@...s.berkeley.edu>, <alex@...ti.fr>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
<daniel.weber@...pa.de>, <michael.schwarz@...pa.de>,
<marton.bognar@...euven.be>, <jo.vanbulck@...euven.be>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] riscv: Use pointer masking to limit uaccess speculation
Thanks for the review. You're right - we should only clear the sign bit
(b38/b47/b56 depending on mode), not b63. Clearing upper bits would
interfere with pointer masking.
Here's a fix that computes the sign bit position arithmetically to avoid
branches, this ensures the mitigation cannot be bypassed under speculation.
This is basically the VA_BITS macro but computed in a branch-free way.
In arch/riscv/include/asm/uaccess.h:
#define UACCESS_SIGN_BIT \
(VA_BITS_SV39 - 1 + 9*((unsigned long)pgtable_l4_enabled) + \
9*((unsigned long)pgtable_l5_enabled))
#define uaccess_mask_ptr(ptr) ((__typeof__(ptr))__uaccess_mask_ptr(ptr))
static inline void __user *__uaccess_mask_ptr(const void __user *ptr)
{
return (void __user *)((unsigned long)ptr & ~BIT_ULL(UACCESS_SIGN_BIT));
}
This evaluates to bit 38 for Sv39, bit 47 for Sv48, and bit 56 for Sv57.
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