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Message-ID: <3ad9ded9b3a269908eee6c79b70dbf432e60ce8d.camel@kernel.org>
Date: Tue, 06 Jan 2026 07:01:08 -0500
From: Jeff Layton <jlayton@...nel.org>
To: Frederick Lawler <fred@...udflare.com>, Mimi Zohar
 <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,  Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>, Dmitry
 Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>, Eric Snowberg	
 <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, James Morris	
 <jmorris@...ei.org>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, "Darrick J.
 Wong"	 <djwong@...nel.org>, Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>, Josef
 Bacik	 <josef@...icpanda.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, kernel-team@...udflare.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC] ima: Fallback to a ctime guard without i_version
 updates

On Mon, 2025-12-29 at 11:52 -0600, Frederick Lawler wrote:
> Since commit 1cf7e834a6fb ("xfs: switch to multigrain timestamps"), IMA
> is no longer able to correctly track inode.i_version due to the struct
> kstat.change_cookie no longer containing an updated i_version.
> 
> Introduce a fallback mechanism for IMA that instead tracks a
> integrity_ctime_guard() in absence of or outdated i_version
> for stacked file systems.
> 
> EVM is left alone since it mostly cares about the backing inode.
> 
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aTspr4_h9IU4EyrR@CMGLRV3
> Fixes: 1cf7e834a6fb ("xfs: switch to multigrain timestamps")
> Suggested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@...nel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Frederick Lawler <fred@...udflare.com>
> ---
> The motivation behind this was that file systems that use the
> cookie to set the i_version for stacked file systems may still do so.
> Then add in the ctime_guard as a fallback if there's a detected change.
> The assumption is that the ctime will be different if the i_version is
> different anyway for non-stacked file systems.
> 
> I'm not too pleased with passing in struct file* to
> integrity_inode_attrs_changed() since EVM doesn't currently use
> that for now, but I couldn't come up with another idea to get the
> stat without coming up with a new stat function to accommodate just
> the file path, fully separate out IMA/EVM checks, or lastly add stacked
> file system support to EVM (which doesn't make much sense to me
> at the moment).
> 
> I plan on adding in self test infrastructure for the v1, but I would
> like to get some early feedback on the approach first.
> ---
>  include/linux/integrity.h           | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
>  security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c |  2 +-
>  security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c   |  2 +-
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c    | 21 +++++++++++++++------
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c   | 17 ++++++++++-------
>  5 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/integrity.h b/include/linux/integrity.h
> index f5842372359be5341b6870a43b92e695e8fc78af..4964c0f2bbda0ca450d135b9b738bc92256c375a 100644
> --- a/include/linux/integrity.h
> +++ b/include/linux/integrity.h
> @@ -31,19 +31,27 @@ static inline void integrity_load_keys(void)
>  
>  /* An inode's attributes for detection of changes */
>  struct integrity_inode_attributes {
> +	u64 ctime_guard;
>  	u64 version;		/* track inode changes */
>  	unsigned long ino;
>  	dev_t dev;
>  };
>  
> +static inline u64 integrity_ctime_guard(struct kstat stat)
> +{
> +	return stat.ctime.tv_sec ^ stat.ctime.tv_nsec;
> +}
> +
>  /*
>   * On stacked filesystems the i_version alone is not enough to detect file data
>   * or metadata change. Additional metadata is required.
>   */
>  static inline void
>  integrity_inode_attrs_store(struct integrity_inode_attributes *attrs,
> -			    u64 i_version, const struct inode *inode)
> +			    u64 i_version, u64 ctime_guard,
> +			    const struct inode *inode)
>  {
> +	attrs->ctime_guard = ctime_guard;
>  	attrs->version = i_version;
>  	attrs->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
>  	attrs->ino = inode->i_ino;
> @@ -54,11 +62,22 @@ integrity_inode_attrs_store(struct integrity_inode_attributes *attrs,
>   */
>  static inline bool
>  integrity_inode_attrs_changed(const struct integrity_inode_attributes *attrs,
> -			      const struct inode *inode)
> +			      struct file *file, struct inode *inode)
>  {
> -	return (inode->i_sb->s_dev != attrs->dev ||
> -		inode->i_ino != attrs->ino ||
> -		!inode_eq_iversion(inode, attrs->version));
> +	struct kstat stat;
> +
> +	if (inode->i_sb->s_dev != attrs->dev ||
> +	    inode->i_ino != attrs->ino)
> +		return true;
> +
> +	if (inode_eq_iversion(inode, attrs->version))
> +		return false;
> +
> +	if (!file || vfs_getattr_nosec(&file->f_path, &stat, STATX_CTIME,
> +				       AT_STATX_SYNC_AS_STAT))
> +		return true;
> +

This is rather odd. You're sampling the i_version field directly, but
if it's not equal then you go through ->getattr() to get the ctime.

It's particularly odd since you don't know whether the i_version field
is even implemented on the fs. On filesystems where it isn't, the
i_version field generally stays at 0, so won't this never fall through
to do the vfs_getattr_nosec() call on those filesystems?

Ideally, you should just call vfs_getattr_nosec() early on with
STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE|STATX_CTIME to get both at once, and only trust
STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE if it's set in the returned mask.

> +	return attrs->ctime_guard != integrity_ctime_guard(stat);
>  }
>  
>  
> diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> index a5e730ffda57fbc0a91124adaa77b946a12d08b4..2d89c0e8d9360253f8dad52d2a8168127bb4d3b8 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> @@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
>  		if (IS_I_VERSION(inode))
>  			i_version = inode_query_iversion(inode);
>  		integrity_inode_attrs_store(&iint->metadata_inode, i_version,
> -					    inode);
> +					    0, inode);
>  	}
>  
>  	/* Portable EVM signatures must include an IMA hash */
> diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> index 73d500a375cb37a54f295b0e1e93fd6e5d9ecddc..0712802628fd6533383f9855687e19bef7b771c7 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> @@ -754,7 +754,7 @@ bool evm_metadata_changed(struct inode *inode, struct inode *metadata_inode)
>  	if (iint) {
>  		ret = (!IS_I_VERSION(metadata_inode) ||
>  		       integrity_inode_attrs_changed(&iint->metadata_inode,
> -						     metadata_inode));
> +			       NULL, metadata_inode));
>  		if (ret)
>  			iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
>  	}
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> index c35ea613c9f8d404ba4886e3b736c3bab29d1668..72bba8daa588a0f4e45e4249276edb54ca3d77ef 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> @@ -254,6 +254,7 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
>  	int length;
>  	void *tmpbuf;
>  	u64 i_version = 0;
> +	u64 ctime_guard = 0;
>  
>  	/*
>  	 * Always collect the modsig, because IMA might have already collected
> @@ -272,10 +273,16 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
>  	 * to an initial measurement/appraisal/audit, but was modified to
>  	 * assume the file changed.
>  	 */
> -	result = vfs_getattr_nosec(&file->f_path, &stat, STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE,
> +	result = vfs_getattr_nosec(&file->f_path, &stat,
> +				   STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE | STATX_CTIME,
>  				   AT_STATX_SYNC_AS_STAT);
> -	if (!result && (stat.result_mask & STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE))
> -		i_version = stat.change_cookie;
> +	if (!result) {
> +		if (stat.result_mask & STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE)
> +			i_version = stat.change_cookie;
> +
> +		if (stat.result_mask & STATX_CTIME)
> +			ctime_guard = integrity_ctime_guard(stat);
> +	}
>  	hash.hdr.algo = algo;
>  	hash.hdr.length = hash_digest_size[algo];
>  
> @@ -305,11 +312,13 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
>  
>  	iint->ima_hash = tmpbuf;
>  	memcpy(iint->ima_hash, &hash, length);
> -	if (real_inode == inode)
> +	if (real_inode == inode) {
>  		iint->real_inode.version = i_version;
> -	else
> +		iint->real_inode.ctime_guard = ctime_guard;
> +	} else {
>  		integrity_inode_attrs_store(&iint->real_inode, i_version,
> -					    real_inode);
> +				ctime_guard, real_inode);
> +	}
>  
>  	/* Possibly temporary failure due to type of read (eg. O_DIRECT) */
>  	if (!result)
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index 5770cf691912aa912fc65280c59f5baac35dd725..6051ea4a472fc0b0dd7b4e81da36eff8bd048c62 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
>  #include <linux/mount.h>
>  #include <linux/mman.h>
>  #include <linux/slab.h>
> +#include <linux/stat.h>
>  #include <linux/xattr.h>
>  #include <linux/ima.h>
>  #include <linux/fs.h>
> @@ -185,6 +186,7 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
>  {
>  	fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
>  	bool update;
> +	int ret;
>  
>  	if (!(mode & FMODE_WRITE))
>  		return;
> @@ -197,12 +199,13 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
>  
>  		update = test_and_clear_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR,
>  					    &iint->atomic_flags);
> -		if ((iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE) ||
> -		    vfs_getattr_nosec(&file->f_path, &stat,
> -				      STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE,
> -				      AT_STATX_SYNC_AS_STAT) ||
> -		    !(stat.result_mask & STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE) ||
> -		    stat.change_cookie != iint->real_inode.version) {
> +		ret = vfs_getattr_nosec(&file->f_path, &stat,
> +					STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE | STATX_CTIME,
> +					AT_STATX_SYNC_AS_STAT);
> +		if ((iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE) || ret ||
> +		    (!ret && stat.change_cookie != iint->real_inode.version) ||
> +		    (!ret && integrity_ctime_guard(stat) !=
> +		     iint->real_inode.ctime_guard)) {
>  			iint->flags &= ~(IMA_DONE_MASK | IMA_NEW_FILE);
>  			iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
>  			if (update)
> @@ -330,7 +333,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
>  	    (action & IMA_DO_MASK) && (iint->flags & IMA_DONE_MASK)) {
>  		if (!IS_I_VERSION(real_inode) ||
>  		    integrity_inode_attrs_changed(&iint->real_inode,
> -						  real_inode)) {
> +						  file, real_inode)) {
>  			iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK;
>  			iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
>  		}
> 
> ---
> base-commit: 8f0b4cce4481fb22653697cced8d0d04027cb1e8
> change-id: 20251212-xfs-ima-fixup-931780a62c2c
> 
> Best regards,

-- 
Jeff Layton <jlayton@...nel.org>

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