[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20080528201400.GG30402@sequoia.sous-sol.org>
Date: Wed, 28 May 2008 13:14:00 -0700
From: Chris Wright <chrisw@...s-sol.org>
To: Stephen Hemminger <stephen.hemminger@...tta.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Chris Wright <chrisw@...ux-foundation.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] sysctl: permission check based on capability not euid
* Stephen Hemminger (stephen.hemminger@...tta.com) wrote:
> This patch modifies the permission checks for sysctl's from being based on uid=0 (root)
> to use the capability system. This matches the behavior of other OS's using sysctl's
> and capabilities. Linux has tried to get away from using uid=0 for security overrides
> and use capabilities instead.
>
> I was working on Quagga enhancement that involved enabling a sysctl, and it didn't
> work because is a safe daemon and drops privileges and resets its real/effective uid
> after initialization; it then re-enables only the capabilities when it needs to
> do some privileged operation. This wouldn't work because sysctl's were still using
> the root based permission check. The existing code in quagga to enable ip forwarding
> doesn't work for the same reason.
I don't think CAP_SYS_ADMIN makes sense for net.*, for example.
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe netdev" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Powered by blists - more mailing lists