netdev - Re: [PATCH]: SCTP length validation.

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-Id: <20080623.144207.89110071.davem@davemloft.net>
Date:	Mon, 23 Jun 2008 14:42:07 -0700 (PDT)
From:	David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
To:	vladislav.yasevich@...com
Cc:	netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-sctp@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH]: SCTP length validation.

From: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@...com>
Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2008 11:59:43 -0400

> David Miller wrote:
> > From: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@...com>
> > Date: Sat, 21 Jun 2008 11:55:19 -0400
> > 
> >> The same vulnerability also exists in sctp_getsockopt_peer_addrs_old().
> >> It's a bit more difficult to trigger since there is a dependency on
> >> the peer being multihomed as well, but it's still possible to cause the
> >> overwrite.
> > 
> > I can't see how that's possible.  This case looks harmless to
> > me.
> > 
> > The kernel side accesses are perfectly protected.  The kernel
> > will only access the actual address list stored via:
 ...
> 
> You are right.  I didn't look far enough.  Since there is no kmalloc(),
> the overflow of kernel memory is not possible, and copy_to_user should
> take care of any overflows of the user memory.

Thanks for double-checking my analysis Vlad.
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe netdev" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html