netdev - Re: [PATCH]: SCTP length validation.

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Message-ID: <485FC86F.4090808@hp.com>
Date:	Mon, 23 Jun 2008 11:59:43 -0400
From:	Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@...com>
To:	David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Cc:	netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-sctp@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH]: SCTP length validation.

David Miller wrote:
> From: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@...com>
> Date: Sat, 21 Jun 2008 11:55:19 -0400
> 
>> The same vulnerability also exists in sctp_getsockopt_peer_addrs_old().
>> It's a bit more difficult to trigger since there is a dependency on
>> the peer being multihomed as well, but it's still possible to cause the
>> overwrite.
> 
> I can't see how that's possible.  This case looks harmless to
> me.
> 
> The kernel side accesses are perfectly protected.  The kernel
> will only access the actual address list stored via:
> 
> 	list_for_each_entry(from, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list,
> 				transports) {
>  ...
> 		cnt ++;
> 		if (cnt >= getaddrs.addr_num) break;
> 	}
> 	getaddrs.addr_num = cnt;
> 
> Copies are only made to userspace, and the given ->addr_num only
> serves as an early break-out from that loop.  I mean, take a look,
> those lines in the above are the only aaccesses made to the user's
> provided addr_num value.
> 
> There is no possibility to use strange ->addr_num values
> in order to read or write kernel memory outside of the
> intended bounds.
> 
> I don't even see any value to adding new checks here.
> 

You are right.  I didn't look far enough.  Since there is no kmalloc(),
the overflow of kernel memory is not possible, and copy_to_user should
take care of any overflows of the user memory.

-vlad

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