[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <200904211954.GGC13036.FFJLtOMHOVSOQF@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Date: Tue, 21 Apr 2009 19:54:06 +0900
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
To: paul.moore@...com
Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] LSM: Add security_socket_post_accept() and security_socket_post_recv_datagram().
Paul Moore wrote:
> > The security_socket_post_accept() hook is used for not only
> > aborting TCP connections from unwanted peers but also associating client's
> > information with a process who handles that TCP connection. The task's state
> > variable definitely requires a LSM hook which is called after sock->ops->
> > accept() call.
>
> I don't have a problem with using a socket_post_accept() hook to assign/modify
> state, however, I still not like the idea of using the socket_post_accept()
> hook to abort connections.
What do you think that assigning/modifying state at socket_post_accept() could
fail?
TOMOYO 1.x never fails since task's state variable is directly attached to
"struct task_struct" but TOMOYO 2.x can fail since task's state variable will
be indirectly attached via current->cred->security and memory allocation
failure for new credential could occur. Though it unlikely fails, I have to
abort connections by returning an error at socket_post_accept() hook if failed.
I think the socket_post_accept() hook anyway need to be able to abort
connections. (Or prepare new credential at socket_accept() and add a hook for
discarding prepared credential when sock->ops->accept() returned an error?)
Regards.
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe netdev" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Powered by blists - more mailing lists