netdev - Re: [PATCH 3/3] Revert Backoff [v3]: Calculate TCP's connection close threshold as a time value.

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Message-ID: <4A9BD7AB.7060207@gmail.com>
Date:	Mon, 31 Aug 2009 16:01:15 +0200
From:	Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>
To:	Damian Lukowski <damian@....rwth-aachen.de>
CC:	Netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] Revert Backoff [v3]: Calculate TCP's connection close
 threshold as a time value.

Damian Lukowski a écrit :
> RFC 1122 specifies two threshold values R1 and R2 for connection timeouts,
> which may represent a number of allowed retransmissions or a timeout value.
> Currently linux uses sysctl_tcp_retries{1,2} to specify the thresholds
> in number of allowed retransmissions.
> 
> For any desired threshold R2 (by means of time) one can specify tcp_retries2
> (by means of number of retransmissions) such that TCP will not time out
> earlier than R2. This is the case, because the RTO schedule follows a fixed
> pattern, namely exponential backoff.
> 
> However, the RTO behaviour is not predictable any more if RTO backoffs can be
> reverted, as it is the case in the draft
> "Make TCP more Robust to Long Connectivity Disruptions"
> (http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-zimmermann-tcp-lcd).
> 
> In the worst case TCP would time out a connection after 3.2 seconds, if the
> initial RTO equaled MIN_RTO and each backoff has been reverted.
> 
> This patch introduces a function retransmits_timed_out(N),
> which calculates the timeout of a TCP connection, assuming an initial
> RTO of MIN_RTO and N unsuccessful, exponentially backed-off retransmissions.
> 
> Whenever timeout decisions are made by comparing the retransmission counter
> to some value N, this function can be used, instead.
> 
> The meaning of tcp_retries2 will be changed, as many more RTO retransmissions
> can occur than the value indicates. However, it yields a timeout which is
> similar to the one of an unpatched, exponentially backing off TCP in the same
> scenario. As no application could rely on an RTO greater than MIN_RTO, there
> should be no risk of a regression.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Damian Lukowski <damian@....rwth-aachen.de>
> ---
>  include/net/tcp.h    |   18 ++++++++++++++++++
>  net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c |   11 +++++++----
>  2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h
> index c35b329..17d1a88 100644
> --- a/include/net/tcp.h
> +++ b/include/net/tcp.h
> @@ -1247,6 +1247,24 @@ static inline struct sk_buff *tcp_write_queue_prev(struct sock *sk, struct sk_bu
>  #define tcp_for_write_queue_from_safe(skb, tmp, sk)			\
>  	skb_queue_walk_from_safe(&(sk)->sk_write_queue, skb, tmp)
>  
> +static inline bool retransmits_timed_out(const struct sock *sk,
> +					 unsigned int boundary)
> +{
> +	int limit, K;
> +	if (!inet_csk(sk)->icsk_retransmits)
> +		return false;
> +
> +	K = ilog2(TCP_RTO_MAX/TCP_RTO_MIN);
> +
> +	if (boundary <= K)
> +		limit = ((2 << boundary) - 1) * TCP_RTO_MIN;
> +	else
> +		limit = ((2 << K) - 1) * TCP_RTO_MIN +
> +			(boundary - K) * TCP_RTO_MAX;

Doing this computation might allow us to respect RFC 1122 here :
 
"The value of R2 SHOULD correspond to at least 100 seconds."

adding a third parameter to retransmits_timed_out(), min_limit,
being 100*HZ if sysctl_tcp_retries2 was used...

limit = min(min_limit, limit);


> +
> +	return (tcp_time_stamp - tcp_sk(sk)->retrans_stamp) >= limit;
> +}
> +
>  static inline struct sk_buff *tcp_send_head(struct sock *sk)
>  {
>  	return sk->sk_send_head;
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c
> index a3ba494..2972d7b 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c
> @@ -137,13 +137,14 @@ static int tcp_write_timeout(struct sock *sk)
>  {
>  	struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
>  	int retry_until;
> +	bool do_reset;
>  
>  	if ((1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_SYN_SENT | TCPF_SYN_RECV)) {
>  		if (icsk->icsk_retransmits)
>  			dst_negative_advice(&sk->sk_dst_cache);
>  		retry_until = icsk->icsk_syn_retries ? : sysctl_tcp_syn_retries;
>  	} else {
> -		if (icsk->icsk_retransmits >= sysctl_tcp_retries1) {
> +		if (retransmits_timed_out(sk, sysctl_tcp_retries1)) {
>  			/* Black hole detection */
>  			tcp_mtu_probing(icsk, sk);
>  
> @@ -155,13 +156,15 @@ static int tcp_write_timeout(struct sock *sk)
>  			const int alive = (icsk->icsk_rto < TCP_RTO_MAX);
>  
>  			retry_until = tcp_orphan_retries(sk, alive);
> +			do_reset = alive ||
> +				   !retransmits_timed_out(sk, retry_until);
>  
> -			if (tcp_out_of_resources(sk, alive || icsk->icsk_retransmits < retry_until))
> +			if (tcp_out_of_resources(sk, do_reset))
>  				return 1;
>  		}
>  	}
>  
> -	if (icsk->icsk_retransmits >= retry_until) {
> +	if (retransmits_timed_out(sk, retry_until)) {
>  		/* Has it gone just too far? */
>  		tcp_write_err(sk);
>  		return 1;
> @@ -385,7 +388,7 @@ void tcp_retransmit_timer(struct sock *sk)
>  out_reset_timer:
>  	icsk->icsk_rto = min(icsk->icsk_rto << 1, TCP_RTO_MAX);
>  	inet_csk_reset_xmit_timer(sk, ICSK_TIME_RETRANS, icsk->icsk_rto, TCP_RTO_MAX);
> -	if (icsk->icsk_retransmits > sysctl_tcp_retries1)
> +	if (retransmits_timed_out(sk, sysctl_tcp_retries1 + 1))
>  		__sk_dst_reset(sk);
>  
>  out:;

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