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Message-ID: <4C91292F.3090602@trash.net>
Date: Wed, 15 Sep 2010 22:14:39 +0200
From: Patrick McHardy <kaber@...sh.net>
To: Luciano Coelho <luciano.coelho@...ia.com>
CC: ext Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@...ozas.de>,
M�kel� Juhani
<ext-juhani.3.makela@...ia.com>,
ext Changli Gao <xiaosuo@...il.com>,
"netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org" <netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org>,
"netdev@...r.kernel.org" <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] netfilter: xt_condition: add security capability support
Am 27.08.2010 09:55, schrieb Luciano Coelho:
> That's what I tried to say when I said that we have a security team
> taking care of this. They are implementing solutions to make the
> product more secure, defending it against malware, misuse, attacks and
> other such things. In this specific case, security-wise, we are trying
> to prevent some bogus or malicious application from changing our
> netfilter rules and causing havoc.
>
> LSM doesn't seem to be an option, here I quote Juhani (my colleague from
> our security team):
>
>> The problem with capabilites is that they are assigned to binaries, not
>> users. Kind of a setuid-mechanism, really. In our embedded environment
>> that makes a lot of sense, but in a server-type environment with
>> multiple users and a competent sysadmin, not so much. In such an
>> environment using a LSM might also actually make sense. But for us it's
>> not an option, mostly because LSMs are not stackable - you can have only
>> one effective at any time - and I'm afraid we have already reserved some
>> of the LSM hooks.
>
> Maybe Juhani can clarify this a bit more.
>
> One other idea that Juhani had was to add an option to the condition
> match/target where the capability requiremets could be set, instead of
> checking them by default. If nothing is specified, everything still
> works as before (no caps checks). Or even a Kconfig option?
I agree with Jan, adding module parameters to control permission checks
or capabilities seems like a bad precedent.
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