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Message-ID: <1285098960.10579.14.camel@powerslave>
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 2010 22:56:00 +0300
From: Luciano Coelho <luciano.coelho@...ia.com>
To: ext Patrick McHardy <kaber@...sh.net>
Cc: ext Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@...ozas.de>,
"Makela Juhani.3 (EXT-Nixu/Helsinki)" <ext-juhani.3.makela@...ia.com>,
ext Changli Gao <xiaosuo@...il.com>,
"netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org" <netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org>,
"netdev@...r.kernel.org" <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] netfilter: xt_condition: add security capability
support
On Wed, 2010-09-15 at 22:14 +0200, ext Patrick McHardy wrote:
> Am 27.08.2010 09:55, schrieb Luciano Coelho:
> > That's what I tried to say when I said that we have a security team
> > taking care of this. They are implementing solutions to make the
> > product more secure, defending it against malware, misuse, attacks and
> > other such things. In this specific case, security-wise, we are trying
> > to prevent some bogus or malicious application from changing our
> > netfilter rules and causing havoc.
> >
> > LSM doesn't seem to be an option, here I quote Juhani (my colleague from
> > our security team):
> >
> >> The problem with capabilites is that they are assigned to binaries, not
> >> users. Kind of a setuid-mechanism, really. In our embedded environment
> >> that makes a lot of sense, but in a server-type environment with
> >> multiple users and a competent sysadmin, not so much. In such an
> >> environment using a LSM might also actually make sense. But for us it's
> >> not an option, mostly because LSMs are not stackable - you can have only
> >> one effective at any time - and I'm afraid we have already reserved some
> >> of the LSM hooks.
> >
> > Maybe Juhani can clarify this a bit more.
> >
> > One other idea that Juhani had was to add an option to the condition
> > match/target where the capability requiremets could be set, instead of
> > checking them by default. If nothing is specified, everything still
> > works as before (no caps checks). Or even a Kconfig option?
>
> I agree with Jan, adding module parameters to control permission checks
> or capabilities seems like a bad precedent.
Okay, the idea is now officially dropped. We'll use normal ACL to
control access to the conditions.
Thanks for your comments and sorry for trying to push ;)
--
Cheers,
Luca.
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