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Message-ID: <20120928082119.GA32008@elgon.mountain>
Date: Fri, 28 Sep 2012 11:21:19 +0300
From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...cle.com>
To: "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>,
Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@...tta.com>,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, kernel-janitors@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [patch] net/key/af_key.c: add range checks on ->sadb_x_policy_len
Because sizeof() is size_t then if "len" is negative, it counts as a
large positive value.
The call tree looks like:
pfkey_sendmsg()
-> pfkey_process()
-> pfkey_spdadd()
-> parse_ipsecrequests()
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...cle.com>
---
This is a static checker fix. I'm not very familiar with this code.
I think if we were to hit this then we would try to parse invalid data
and it would return -EINVAL or similar error code pretty quickly.
diff --git a/net/key/af_key.c b/net/key/af_key.c
index 2ca7d7f..7714df0 100644
--- a/net/key/af_key.c
+++ b/net/key/af_key.c
@@ -1923,6 +1923,9 @@ parse_ipsecrequests(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct sadb_x_policy *pol)
int len = pol->sadb_x_policy_len*8 - sizeof(struct sadb_x_policy);
struct sadb_x_ipsecrequest *rq = (void*)(pol+1);
+ if (pol->sadb_x_policy_len * 8 < sizeof(struct sadb_x_policy))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
while (len >= sizeof(struct sadb_x_ipsecrequest)) {
if ((err = parse_ipsecrequest(xp, rq)) < 0)
return err;
--
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